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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
This topic has the objective of analyzing the football clubs considered as a commercial firm, 
observing the main aspects to success and to a sustainable development.  
The analysis will be conducted using historical, social, economic and financial data and 
numbers.  
This work consists of five chapters.  
The first chapter presents the traditional characteristics of a normal company, economics and 
substainability, which are becoming much more important in recent years in relation to footbll 
clubs.  
In the past sport results were the most important aspects. However nowdays we are looking at 
a change which is a combination of sport and commercial results taking place. Football clubs 
are moving from non-profit to profit-oriented firms. Sometimes economic numbers related to 
revenue, costs and earnings are so essential that they put the result on the field in the background 
forgetting about the basic football principles as a sport. 
The same reasoning does not apply to the American football model which is a utility-oriented 
model based on an exemption system (this will be dealt with later). 
Financial fair play is also playing a fundamental role towards economic and sustainability 
principles. This regulation, approved in 2010 and entered into force in 2011, aims at corporate 
self-financing and break-even point in the financial statements within a limited numbers of 
years. 
Chapter two includes a complete analysis of football clubs business models. This includes 
governance, management, main revenue, costs, football stadiums as an important element to 
increase either revenue from tickets sale or supplementary service revenue as bars, restaurants, 
shops, marketing and communication and finishing up with property tranfers. 
The third chapter takes into consideration more empirical data concerning accounting systems 
and creative accounting. Creative accounting consists of accounting practices that follow 
required laws and regulations but deviate from what those standards intend to accomplish. 
Creative accounting capitalizes on loopholes in the accounting standards to falsely portray a 
better image of the company. Although creative accounting practices are legal, the loopholes 
they exploit are often rewritten to prevent such behaviors. Football industry, which includes 
both listed and unlisted companies, is a specific sector where creative accounting practices are 
widespread and well known. 
Chapter four explores financial performances related to the impact of 2017’s transfer market 
window and financial statement repercussions in relation to AC Milan and FC Juventus. 
2 
 
Furthermore, it shows the top European clubs’ revenue growth and comparisons between the 
top five’s championships in term of revenue. 
Chapter five develops conclusions and some personal thinking and consideration about the 
football world in general today.  
 
In the end, I would like to thank my supervisor for the guidance and advice he has provided 
throughout my time as his student. 
 
1.1 ECONOMY PRINCIPLE 
A company to be an economic organization must be lasting. It must be carried out according to 
working conditions that will allow it to last over time in a changing environment. This principle 
can be applied not only to a normal commercial firm but also to a football club. Lasting means 
the business must be conducted on an ongoing concern principle1. 
Any enterprise that intends to last and does not have to depend on the benevolence of a 
stakeholder must pursue economic conditions that are conditions of income balance and 
monetary equilibrium. 
In orde to better describe this principle, a preliminar distinction must be as follows. 
 Income equilibrium - It is obtained when revenue from the sale of goods and services 
to the market cover the costs incurred for the purchase of all the production factors. 
Only when positive income components cover the negative ones can the enterprise 
be considered vital or capable of living autonomously without the need for third 
party intervention. The company must be efficient and stable at an average level of 
efficiency expressed in terms of production process technical performance. In the 
long run, the business activity must be capable of producing a profitability that is 
enough to remunerate the invested capital and also to a certain extent produce self-
financing. This objective is obviously achieved if the company is able to produce 
revenue higher than costs in year-by-year business operations and therefore profits. 
 Monetary equilibrium - Situation reflecting the company's ability to cope with cash 
outflows with its own revenue. This is a dynamic concept as it derives from the 
comparison of two cash flows over time. It depends not only on the amount of cash 
inflow and outflow but also on their frequency. In other words, the cadence of the 
first may not coincide with the second so in a given time cash-in may differ from 
                                                 
1 Going concern is an accounting term for a company that has the resources needed to continue to operate indefinitely until 
that company provides evidence to the contrary. This term also refers to a company's ability to make enough money to stay 
afloat and avoid bankruptcy.  
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cash-out even if revenue and costs are equivalent. If cash outflow is higher than cash 
inflow, this generates the use of external sources of financing  such as loans. If cash 
inflow is higher than cash outflow, this generates excess of liquidity. Hence, the 
company must be momentarily able to meet the payment commitments. It is 
financial management’s task to provide sufficient financial resources to enable the 
company to carry out the business. Looking at the short run, for instance, a situation 
in which we have monetary equilibrium is when account receivables are able to 
cover account payables without considering  inventory estimates. 
 
In other words, the economy is the institution's ability to operate without accumulating losses. 
At the same time, other aspects are effectiveness, efficiency, institutional equilibrium, 
durability and autonomy which can be linked to the definition of economy. 
Effectiveness refers to the extent to which an activity achieves desired outcomes. It refers to 
the company’s ability to achieve what it set out to do. Measures of effectiveness focus on the 
comparison of actual results with present expectations or standards. 
Efficiency, by contrast, refers to the level of resources that were consumed to achieve a certain 
level of output. It is related to how many resources were used to achieve the actual output. 
Efficiency focuses on ratios of inputs to outputs.  
In other words, efficiency means "doing the thing right," effectiveness means "doing the right 
thing”.  
Institutional equilibrium means all members of the institute share the values and objectives of 
the institute and receive rewards considered appropriate for the efforts. 
It is a long-term equilibrium and there is institutional balance when the members stay in the 
company.  
These general principles and rules also count for football companies.  
Football has become a high-intensity sport business in recent years being able to generate large 
amounts of revenues, costs, investment and therefore financial flows. 
For these reasons the management of a soccer company now has major implications from the 
point of view of  management, economics and finance. 
Any club has to deal with aspects such as business organization, budgeting schemes, 
accounting, obligations and equilibrium concepts. 
In today's world a football club can be considered through and through as a business company 
driven by an economic entity who is responsible for organizing productive factors effectively 
and efficiently,with a certain level of decision-making autonomy. 
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The goal is not only to achieve the sporting result but also short and long-term economic balance 
by monitoring costs and avoiding waste of resources in order to generate financial flows that 
will enable business continuity. 
 
1.2 UEFA CLUB LICENSING AND FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY REGULATIONS 
Platini, former UEFA’s president and Financial Fair Play (FFP) creator, said that club owners 
themselves were asking for help "After years of anarchy, it was time to give rules." They all 
agree, or almost do, that a model where a wealthy owner who invests money just in his spare 
time and then gets tired and leaves is no longer sustainable. Football does not have to be a toy 
for rich men anymore but it must be able to “stay alone”. The FFP legislation does not have a 
coercive nature but it is intended to help clubs get out of a crisis situation that could be fatal to 
the whole system.  
The introduction of FFP regulations is a direct response by UEFA to curb recent development 
where clubs during recent years, despite increased revenue, have experienced substantial losses. 
Clubs continously spend more than what they earn which is reflected in their balance sheets. 
It wants to protect the health of football, its continuity and its long-term economic viability. To 
ensure fair competition, a certain financial rigor must be reached in order to stimulate 
investment in infrastructure and youth sector. 
UEFA Club Licensing system has been introduced since 2004-2005 and it represents a key 
project to promote football club credibility. The aim is to pull European football to see behind 
the short run towards long-run goals.  
The licensing systems consider that single European football legislations are responsable for 
the supervision and the respect of quality standards in compliance with laws and regulations.  
It is the single legislation affiliated to UEFA2 that has the power to grant the license.  
In accordance with UEFA club licensing and FFP regulation 2015 document3, a licence is a 
certificate granted by the licensor confirming fulfilment of all minimum criteria by the licence 
applicant as part of the admission procedure for entering UEFA club competitions. A license is 
necessary in order to take part in the UEFA’s competitions. 
Club licensing criteria are requirements divided into five categories (sporting, infrastructure, 
personnel and administrative, legal and financial), to be fulfilled by a licence applicant in order 
to obtain the licence. 
To grant the license, the following criteria must be fulfilled: 
                                                 
2 Union of European Football Association 
3 http://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/Tech/uefaorg/General/02/26/77/91/2267791_DOWNLOAD.pdf  
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1. Sporting Criteria - The licence applicant must have a written youth development 
programme approved by the licensor. The licensor must verify and evaluate the 
implementation of the approved youth development programme. The club must 
prove to be able to conduct a youth development programme with good organisation 
of the youth sector managed by qualified personnel (technical, medical, 
administrative etc.) which meets the minimum qualifications required. The club 
must have available infrastructures which measure up to the youth sector and both 
training and match facilities. Furthermore, the company must organize education 
programmes on the Laws of the Game, anti-doping, racism and integrity. 
Furthermore, financial resources for the development of this area must be planned 
on a three-years basis.  
2. Infrastructure Criteria - The licence applicant must have a stadium available for 
UEFA club competitions which must be within the territory of the UEFA member 
association and approved by the UEFA member association. Available stadium 
means property or having one for its own use. If the licence applicant is not the 
owner of a stadium, it must provide a written contract with the owner(s) of the 
stadium(s) it will use. The same applies to training facilities infrastructure and 
minimal availability. 
3. Personnel and administrative Criteria – The licence applicant must have appointed 
an adequate number of skilled secretarial staff according to its needs to run its daily 
business. It must have an office space where to run its administration. It must ensure 
that its office is open to communicate with the licensor and the public and that it is 
equipped, as a minimum, with phone, fax, email facilities and a website.  
Skilled secreterial staff requires a general manager, sporting director, financial 
officer, media officer, medical doctor, physiotherapist, supporter liasion officer, 
head coach of first squad, assistant head coach and head of the youth development 
programme.  
4. Legal Criteria – The licence applicant must submit a legally valid declaration 
confirming it knows statutes, regulations, directives and decisions of FIFA, UEFA, 
the UEFA member association and, if any, the national league as well as the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Arbitration for Sport and others. 
5. Financial Criteria – The licence applicant determines and provides to the licensor, 
year by year and based on the established expiry dates, the annual and ad interim 
financial statements. In addiction the licence applicant must prove that as at 31 
March preceding the licence season it has no overdue payables towards other 
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football clubs as a result of transfers undertaken prior to the previous 31 December. 
At the same time the licence applicant must prove that as at 31 March preceding the 
licence season it has no overdue payables in respect of its employees as a result of 
contractual or legal obligations that arose prior to the previous 31 December. The 
same also applies for overdue payables towards social tax authorities.  
A debt shall not be deemed to be expired in the event of an extension of the term 
with the creditor or in the case of litigation. Further, the club whom receives the 
license, must provide addictional future financial information in order to 
demonstrate to the licensor its ability to continue as a going concern until the end of 
the licence season. Two indicators must be satisfied which are going concern and 
negative equity. If at least one of these two indicators is not respected, the club has 
to provide  additional future information on a quarterly basis which are profit and 
loss statement, cash flow statement and notes to the financial statements.  
 
Financial fair play regulations were instead introduced in 2010 in addition to the UEFA 
licensing system. It means that after the license has been granted, in the case of UEFA’s 
competitions, clubs must respect FFP requirements. FFP initiatives are limited to European 
competitions. 
An independent and financial supervisory body, the Club Financial Control Panel, has been 
created in order to not only monitor and control the single football federations activity, but also 
verify that all clubs taking part in European competition respect the FFP requirements. 
FFP regulation starts with the description of CFCP’s responsibilities (see above) and with the 
monitoring process.  
The monitoring process starts on submission by the licensor of the list of licensing decisions to 
the UEFA administration and ends at the end of the licence season. 
It consists of the following minimum key steps: 
1. Issuing of the monitoring documentation to the licensor and licensee; 
2. Return of the completed required monitoring documentation by the licensee to the 
licensor; 
3. Assessment and confirmation of the completeness of each licensee’s documents by 
the licensor; 
4. Submission of the validated documentation by the licensor to the UEFA 
administration; 
5. Assessment of the documentation by the UEFA Club Financial Control Body; 
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6. If appropriate, request for additional information by the UEFA administration or 
UEFA Club Financial Control Body; 
7. Decision by the UEFA Club Financial Control Body. 
The licensor is the body that operates the club licensing system, grants licences and undertakes 
certain tasks in respect of the club monitoring process. In Italy, the Italian football League fulfill 
this role.  
The licensor (the federation) must: 
 Cooperate with the UEFA Club Financial Control Body in respect to its requests 
and enquiries; 
 Assess and confirm to the UEFA Club Financial Control Body that the selected 
reporting perimeter is the same as used for the fulfilment of the club licensing 
criteria and is appropriate for club monitoring purposes; 
 Inform the UEFA Club Financial Control Body of any relevant information 
submitted by the licensee in respect of club monitoring requirements and any event 
occurring after the licensing decision that constitutes a significant change to the 
information previously submitted by the licensee. 
The licensee (the club) must inform its own federation in case of any event that might represent 
a significant change with respect to the previous information sent. 
What are the Financial Fair Play criteria? After granting the license all clubs must respect FFP 
requirements:  
1. Break-even requirements; 
2. No overdue payables towards third parties; 
3. Additional information. 
Break-even point is the point in which costs are equal to revenue. Thus company does not incurr 
any loss. Break-even requirements force clubs to operate within theis means arising from 
revenue and the enhanced overdue payables rules encourage clubs to settle their debts when 
due.  
Not all the income components are considered relevant for the break-even result computation. 
Example of relevant revenue4 are gate receipts, sponsorship and advertising, broadcasting 
rights, commercial activities, UEFA solidarity and prize money, other operating income, profit 
on disposal of player registrations (and or income from disposal of player registrations), excess 
proceeds on disposal of tangible fixed assets, finance income and foreign exchange result.  
                                                 
4 Relevant income must be decreased if any of the elements above include any of the following items: non-monetary 
credits/income, income transaction(s) with related party(ies) above fair value, income from non-football operations not 
related to the club. 
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Example of relevant costs 5are cost of sales or materials, employee benefits expenses, other 
operating expenses, loss on disposal and amortisation or impairment of player registrations (and 
or costs of acquiring player registrations), finance costs and dividends. 
Other important requirements are notion of monitoring period, notion of break-even result, 
notion of acceptable deviation and break-even informations. 
A monitoring period is the period over which a licensee is assessed for the purpose of the break-
even requirement. As a rule it covers three reporting periods as follows. 
i) The reporting period ending in the calendar year that the UEFA club competitions 
commence (hereinafter: reporting period T), and 
ii) The reporting period ending in the calendar year before commencement of the 
UEFA club competitions (hereinafter reporting period T-1), and 
iii) The preceding reporting period (hereinafter reporting period T-2). 
As an example, the monitoring period assessed in the licence season 2015/16 covers the 
reporting periods ending in 2015 (reporting period T), in 2014 (reporting period T-1) and in 
2013 (reporting period T-2). 
The difference between relevant income and relevant expenses is the break-even result. 
If a licensee’s relevant expenses are less than relevant income for a reporting period, then the 
club has a break-even surplus. If a club’s relevant expenses are greater than relevant income for 
a reporting period, then the club has a break-even deficit.  
The aggregate break-even result is the sum of the break-even results of each reporting period 
covered by the monitoring period (i.e. reporting periods T, T-1 and T-2).  
If the aggregate break-even result is positive (equal to zero or above), then the licensee has an 
aggregate break-even surplus for the monitoring period. If the aggregate break-even result is 
negative (below zero), then the licensee has an aggregate break-even deficit for the monitoring 
period. 
In case of an aggregate break-even deficit for the monitoring period, the licensee may 
demonstrate that the aggregate deficit is reduced by a surplus (if any) resulting from the sum of 
the break-even results from the two reporting periods prior to T-2 (i.e. reporting periods T-3 
and T-4). 
 
                                                 
5 Relevant expenses must be increased if any of the elements above includes: expense transaction(s) with related party(ies) 
below fair value. Relevant expenses may be decreased if any of the elements above include any of the following items: 
expenditure on youth development activities, expenditure on community development activities, expenditure on women’s 
football activities, non-monetary debits or charges, finance costs directly attributable to the construction and/or substantial 
modification of tangible fixed assets, costs of leasehold improvement, expenses of non-football operations not related to the 
club. 
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The acceptable deviation is the maximum aggregate break-even deficit possible for a club to be 
deemed in compliance with the break-even requirement as defined in Article 63. 
The acceptable deviation is € 5 million. However, it can exceed this level up to € 30 million if 
such excess is entirely covered by contributions from equity participants and/or related parties. 
A lower amount may be decided in due course by the UEFA Executive Committee. 
With regard to break-even information, by the deadline and in the form communicated by the 
UEFA administration, the licensee must prepare and submit the following: 
 
i) The break-even information for the reporting period T-1; 
ii) The break-even information for the reporting period T-2, if not already previously 
submitted; 
iii) The break-even information for the reporting period T if it has breached any of the 
indicators defined as follow: going concern, negative equity, break-even results, 
absence of overdue payables. 
In addition, the UEFA Club Financial Control Body reserves the right to ask the licensee to 
prepare and submit the break-even information for the reporting period T and additional 
information at any time, in particular if the annual financial statements reflect that:  
a) Employee benefits expenses exceed 70% of total revenue; or 
b) Net debt exceeds 100% of total revenue. 
 
The break-even requirement is fulfilled if no indicator (as defined above) is breached and the 
licensee has a break-even surplus for reporting periods T-2 and T-1. 
Other monitoring requirements are the absence of overdue payables towards third parties. 
As at 30 June and as at 30 September of the year in which the UEFA club competitions 
commence, the licensee must not have any overdue payables towards other football clubs as a 
result of transfers undertaken up to 30 June and up to 30 September respectively.  
As at 30 June and as at 30 September of the year in which the UEFA club competitions 
commence, the licensee must not have any overdue payables in respect to its employees and 
social/tax authorities (as defined Articles 50 and 50bis). 
As for additional and final information, the licence applicant must prepare and submit future 
financial information in order to demonstrate to the licensor its ability to continue as a going 
concern until the end of the licence season if it has breached any of the following indicators 
which are going concern and negative equity.  
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The first two monitoring period were 2011/12 and 2012/13. In those years, UEFA left the clubs 
the possibility to settle their own account without strict provisons. Only in the rare case of 
Atletico Madrid some measures were applied.  
From the 2013/14 season, UEFA required more attention to FFP. It established that in each of 
the two-year periods 2011/13 and 2013/15 companies could afford a maximum total loss of € 
45 million. In the three-year period 2015/18 the maximum threshold will be € 30 mln. In 2018 
the maximum adjustable passport will be € 5 million per year. 
In deficit situations the budget losses must be heavily secured by property contributions and or 
capital increases (listed companies). The use of loans, sureties or unclear financial transactions 
is specifically prohibited. 
If a club is not in line with the regulations, UEFA Club Financial Control Body will decide on 
measures and sanctions. 
Non-compliance with the regulations does not mean that a club will be excluded 
automatically but there will be no exceptions. Depending on various factors (i.e. the trend of 
the break-even result) different disciplinary measures may be imposed against clubs. The 
catalogue of measures is6: 
a) Warning; 
b) Reprimand; 
c) Fine; 
d) Deduction of points; 
e) Withholding of revenue from a UEFA competition; 
f) Prohibition on registering new players in UEFA competitions; 
g) Restriction on the number of players that a club may register for participation in 
UEFA competitions including a financial limit on the overall aggregate cost of the 
employee benefits expenses of players registered on the A-list for the purposes of 
UEFA club competitions; 
h) Disqualification from competitions in progress and or exclusion from future 
competitions; 
i) Withdrawal of a title or award. 
 
 
                                                 
6 http://www.uefa.com/community/news/newsid=2064391.html  
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1.2.1 MANCHESTER CITY’S LIMITED CASE 
Manchester City is one of the most important English football clubs. Whether the past was not 
characterized by sporting success and victories, something changed in 2008. 
In that year Abu Dhabi’s sheik, prince Mansur Bid Zayad, decided to enter in the football world 
and bought the club. Thanks to endless financial resources in the transfer market the team was 
going to embrace some of the best players in Europe. Stars like Davide Silva, Yaya Toure and 
Sergio Aguero joined the club. The success was not immediate but afterwards the club reached 
preset goals. Between 2010 and 2014 Manchester City won the FA Cup, League Cup, England 
Supercup and two Premier Leagues. 
On the European stage the team has not yet been able to establish itself even though it has made 
substantial investments in the market year after year with the goal of getting, sooner or later, 
the most important trophy which is the UEFA Champions League.  
This is totally the reason why the ownership has been submitted to FFP controls. 
In the last five seasons (2012-2016) the sheik has paid around € 692 mln7 to buy new players 
and outperformed the other clubs for total investments made. In both the 2015/16 and 2016/17 
transfers market Manchester City spent more than € 200 mln. Currently, considering also 2017 
transfer market summer session, Manchester City is the most expensive team in football history 
with a total amount of € 853 mln spent. 
Some of the other more important European teams started complaning about these crazy 
investments criticising the fact that they would have not been able to compete at this financial 
level.  
As said, the ownership snapped into focus of UEFA’s Control Commission. In the initial FFP 
control period related to 2011/13 the club reported financial cumulative losses of € 170 mln 
which significantly exceeded the limit of € 45 mln.  
Aside from the transfers market expenditures the Citizens hold the record related to wage and 
salary expenses. In 2011/12 and 2012/13, when financial controls started, the incidence of 
personnel wages and salaries over sales turnover was more than 85%8.  
Both parameters, financial cumulative losses and wages over turnover, would be out of FFP’s 
allowed limits. 
The British club leaders were called upon to make their version of the facts in front of the 
UEFA’s leadership with a structured defensive thesis. 
Attorneys have highlighted the great efforts made to fit into the imposed parameters by 
implementing a strategic plan that is reducing the losses. The City has risen in three years from 
                                                 
7 https://www.transfermarkt.it/manchester-city/transfers/verein/281/plus/0?saison_id=2016&pos=&detailpos=&w_s=  
8 Deloitte annual review of football finance 2013 
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an annual budget in the red of € 230 mln (2011/12) to a narrower loss of € 60 mln in 2013/14. 
This is a reduction of more than 70%. This has been positively seen by UEFA for inspection 
purposes. 
Other positive considerations include increasing annual revenue, diversification of revenue, 
total absence of debt and strong investment in infrastructure and youth football. 
Club administrators have tried to rely on these topics to demonstrate to UEFA the effectiveness 
of their long-term business plans and their projects in the long run which forecasted budget 
constraints and the achievement of break even results in a few years. 
The defence topics was partly accepted in May 2014 but did not remove the club from the 
following sanctions, as reported by La Gazzetta dello Sport (2014)9: 
 A fine of € 60 mln held by UEFA's revenue on European competitions. € 40 mls 
will be returned in the coming seasons if the club will adapt to the expected financial 
parameters; 
 Prohibition to increase the current wage bill (instead it has been reduced over the 
years); 
 Reduction of the number of players in the team from 25 to 21. 
Current results are much more encouraging demonstrating that even a ownership with unlimited 
financial capacity, if well managed, can achieve sustainable financial performance. 
Record revenue of € 514 mln announced in the eighth successive season of improved year on 
year financial performance. Record € 27 mln figure represents the second consecutive year of 
profitability for the club (exchange rate euro/pound at 31/05/2016 of 0,7618). Wage/revenue 
ratio of 50% is among the best in the football industry. The club continues to operate with zero 
financial debt10. 
For these reasons Manchester City no longer risk UEFA’s fines and penalties for breaking 
"Financial Fair Play" rules in 2014. 
UEFA said the club complies with ongoing clauses such as limiting their spending on wages 
and transfers through 2016. 
It means Man City forfeited only € 20 mln in Champions League prize money instead of the 
maximum € 60 mln that UEFA threatened to withhold. 
 
                                                 
9 http://www.gazzetta.it/Calcio/Estero/16-05-2014/uefa-fair-play-finanziario-multa-60-milioni-manchester-city-psg-
80687605057.shtml  
10 Manchester City’s annual report 2015/16: https://www.mancity.com/news/club-news/club-news/2016/october/2016-
annual-report  
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1.2.2 FFP RESULTS BASED ON THE COST PER POINT 
In this section we are going to revise last seasons’ sporting results (Serie A and Premier League) 
supposing each team achieves break-even result. 
This method is based on the cost per point of each team in relation to the total turnover. This 
gives the possibility of getting the points each club would have obtained in relation to break 
even point realization. In case of economic loss final points decrease and in case of economic 
profit final points increase. 
This criteria is either subjective or debatable but it repays both sporting and financial 
performance results at the same time. 
Extraordinary income components are not being considered in the total outcome. 
Earnings before taxes are being considered in order to eliminate differences in taxation laws 
between countries. 
The calculation procedure is the follow: 
Outcome – wages = X 
X – (earnings before taxes) = Other costs 
Other costs + wages = Total costs used as cost per point basis 
Total costs / effective points = Cost per point (in mln) 
Outcome / cost per point = FFP points  
 
The first case we are going to analyze is the Italian League in 2014/15 season. 
 
Italian football League – Serie A 2014/15 (‘000 €) 
CLUB OUTCOME WAGES EBT RANK POINTS 
COST 
PER 
POINT 
FFP 
POINTS 
FFP 
RANK 
Juventus 343,635 198,430 10,808 1 87 3,826 90 1 
Roma 206,160 133,179 -35,444 2 70 3,451 60 4 
Lazio 110,929 57,910 8,311 3 69 1,487 75 2 
Fiorentina 94,340 71,952 -49,415 4 64 2,246 42 9 
Napoli 143,398 79,735 -14,875 5 63 2,512 57 5 
Genoa 78,686 44,240 -33,247 6 59 1,897 41 10 
Sampdoria 59,190 43,866 -23,281 7 56 1,473 40 13 
Inter 146,840 106,357 -80,045 8 55 4,125 36 18 
Torino 59,927 34,826 17,435 9 52 817 73 3 
Milan 232,322 146,806 -84,549 10 52 6,094 38 14 
Palermo 90,825 39,600 -3,278 11 49 1,920 47 6 
Sassuolo 66,371 43,075 -21,097 12 49 1,785 37 15 
Verona 51,059 31,738 -7,959 13 46 1,283 40 12 
Chievo 55,420 26,211 673 14 43 1,273 44 7 
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Source: Aida for financial statements. For Fiorentina, Sassuolo, Milan, Genoa, Torino, Atalanta, Sampdoria financial 
statement at 31/12/14; for the others financial statement at 30/06/15 
 
Italian League A in 2014/15 saw Juventus’ victory, as happened in the previous four years, with 
more than 17 points from Roma which ranks in second position.  
This is a clear lead advantage that shows how Juventus is widely deserving the absolute Italian 
dominance in recent years. This is possible thanks to the excellent performance provided on the 
field together with excellent financial performance results. 
In fact it can be noticed how Juventus consolidates its first position even compared to the break 
even point, even increasing the points obtained. 
The highest cost per point are those of Milan and Parma, over € 6 mln, followed by Inter in 
third place. 
The two Milanese teams record the highest losses. This justifies their positions lost in the 
ranking.  
Inter has the worst results. It lost positions and therefore ends up the championship in the 
eighteenth position moving back to league Serie B.  
Fiorentina, in spite of the good sports performance, loses several positions and comes out of 
European competitions. The reason is definitely related to the significant loss that comes to 
almost € 50 million. 
Turin’s results are outstanding thanks to the careful management of President Cairo. The team 
magically reaches third place and therefore the Champions League. 
Two teams with limited turnover, cost-saving policies that survive through the capital gains of 
their players, Chievo and Empoli, earn seven positions respectively. 
Besides, Inter, as already mentioned, Cesena and Parma would be relegated in the field to retire 
in Italian Serie B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Empoli 39,623 17,783 706 15 42 927 43 8 
Udinese 52,341 31,236 -7,078 16 41 1,449 36 17 
Atalanta 61,207 32,134 -2,074 17 37 1,710 36 16 
Cagliari 67,950 20,026 9,766 18 34 1,711 40 11 
Cesena 49,188 16,633 462 19 24 2,030 24 19 
Parma 103,061 40,669 -11,939 20 19 6,053 17 20 
Total 2,,112,472 1,216,406 -326,120      
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The second case we are going to analyze is the Italian League in 2015/16 season. 
 
 
Source: Aida; for Fiorentina, Sassuolo, Milan, Genoa, Torino, Atalanta, Sampdoria financial statement at 31/12/15; 
for the others financial statement at 30/06/16 
 
The 2015/16 season saw a gradual increase in both turnover and salaries. The salaries reached 
56% of the turnover off 2% compared to the previous season. However, this drop in salaries is 
a constant during the last five seasons demonstrating that football clubs have increasingly 
adopted cost-saving policies especially about footballers’ wages. 
Juventus wins the championship again which is no surprise. Victory also manifested at FFP and 
turnover level farther away from that of all other clubs. 
Compared to the previous season Milan and Inter cost-per-point indicators, which are among 
the highest in 2014/15, are reduced thanks to the highest points achieved and to massive cost-
cutting policies. However, the position in the FFP ranking deteriorates significantly for both. 
Fiorentina and Sassuolo confirm their position and they reduce losses compared to the previous 
season. 
CLUB OUTCOME WAGES EBT RANK 
POINT
S 
COST 
PER 
POINT 
FFP 
POINTS 
FFP 
RANK 
Juventus 386,108 216,905 11,608 1 91 4,115 94 1 
Napoli 155,354 81,854 -2,428 2 82 1,924 81 2 
Roma 285,360 150,660 -5,539 3 80 3,636 78 3 
Inter 182,192 109,573 -72,626 4 67 3,803 48 10 
Fiorentina 131,326 74,714 -15,115 5 64 2,288 57 5 
Sassuolo 87,308 46,875 2,231 6 61 1,395 63 4 
Milan 221,035 155,721 -94,440 7 57 5,535 40 15 
Lazio 93,557 56,294 -11,352 8 54 1,943 48 9 
Chievo 66,002 26,608 320 9 50 1,314 50 7 
Genoa 100,629 44,015 -10,112 10 46 2,407 42 12 
Empoli 51,506 25,355 2,690 11 46 1,061 49 8 
Torino 84,532 38,752 14,663 12 45 1,553 54 6 
Atalanta 74,329 31,969 -1,521 13 45 1,686 44 11 
Bologna 48,637 46,885 -31,999 14 42 1,920 25 19 
Sampdoria 85,226 42,713 -1,091 15 40 2,158 39 16 
Palermo 56,377 37,632 1,470 16 39 1,408 40 13 
Udinese 60,453 33,225 -36,190 17 39 2,478 24 20 
Carpi 34,097 14,612 1,374 18 38 861 40 14 
Frosinone 30,150 19,927 1,114 19 31 937 32 17 
Verona 56,548 27,971 662 20 28 1,996 28 18 
 Total 2,290,726 1,282,260 -246,281      
Italian football League – Serie A 2015/16 (‘000 €) 
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Turin continues to climb the FFP ranking also in 2015/16 thanks to a good net profit of € 14 
mln. 
Despite relegation in the field Carpi achieves salvation thanks to the increase in TV rights 
revenue due to the transition from Serie B to Serie A. 
Carpi's turnover in 2016 moved upward from € 10.3 million (€ 10,382,655) in 2015 to € 34 
million (€ 34,096,884) in the year that the Emilians remained in League A. 
An increase of just under € 24 million is almost exclusively justified by the difference in TV 
receipts between League B and League A. In the cadet League television revenue had risen to 
€ 2.3 million euros (€ 2,337,371) and with the promotion rose to € 23.3 million (23,329,138) 
up by 898% (+ € 20.9 million). This has a very broad impact. In 2016 TV rights weighed 68.4% 
on overall revenue while in the budget at 30 June 2015 they were "only" 22.5%11. 
Frosinone also achieves salvation thanks to the importance of TV rights on sales, which account 
for 65% of the total. 
Finally, surprisingly, Udinese and Bologna retreat due to the huge losses. 
 
What about English Premier League? 
It is the most important and famous European championship, both by sporting and financial 
results. Considering the “Big Five”12, Premier League shows the following peculiarities. 
Highest turnover which keeps increasing year by year; the most watched championships in the 
world with the highest number of fans, mostly in Asia; highest numbers of investors or 
entrepreneurs who want to invest money in this business (lots of clubs are owned by foreign 
ownership); the most important championship per number of sponsorhip agreements signed. 
Related to sporting results the following two tables show seasons 2014/15 and 2015/16. 
 
Premier League 2014/15 (‘000£) 
                                                 
11 http://www.calcioefinanza.it/2016/12/19/bilancio-carpi-2016-impatto-diritti-tv/  
12 Premier League, Serie A, Ligue 1, Liga BBVA, Bundesligue 
CLUB OUTCOME WAGES EBT RANK POINTS 
COST 
PER 
POINT 
FFP 
POINTS 
FFP 
RANK 
Chelsea 319 217 -34 1 87 4.06 79 3 
Manchester 
City 
353 194 10 2 79 4.34 81 2 
Arsenal 331 192 25 3 75 4.08 81 1 
Manchester 
Utd 
395 204 -4 4 70 5.70 69 6 
Tottenham 196 107 12 5 64 2.88 68 7 
Liverpool 298 167 60 6 62 3.84 78 4 
Southampton 114 80 15 7 60 1.65 69 5 
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Source: Annual review of Football Finance 2016; the Guardian newspaper13  
 
The 2014/15 season ends up with Chelsea’s victory, Manchester City in second place and 
Arsenal in third place. 
The most important results can be seen from a turnover point of view. 15 teams exceed £ 100 
mln; 4 teams over £ 300 mln with Liverpool approaching this threshold; the lowest turnover of 
£ 79 mln recorded by Burnley surpasses the one of 11 Italian teams in the same reference 
season. 
Premier League clubs’ wage costs exceed £ 2 billion for the first time in 2014/15 with an 
increase of 7%. Despite this cost control regulations at a domestic and European level continue 
to yield encouraging results with clubs having a more sustainable balance between costs and 
revenue. 
Six clubs have a wages/revenue ratio in excess of 70% which is the indicative threshold level 
used by UEFA as part of their Financial Fair Play Regulations. Although there is an increase 
from two clubs in 2013/14 it is still a big reduction from the 11 which exceeded this level in 
2012/13. Promoted club Burnley’s wages/revenue ratio of 37% was the lowest in the Premier 
League since Manchester United recorded 33% in 1998/9914. 
The largest pre-tax profit was achieved by Liverpool (£60m) driven by a £54m net profit on 
player trading due to the sale of Luis Suarez to Barcelona. Six clubs recorded pre-tax losses the 
highest being Queens Park Rangers (£46m)15. 
                                                 
13 https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/may/25/premier-league-finances-club-by-club-breakdown-david-conn 
 
14 Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance 2016 
15 Ibidem note 10 
Swansea City 103 83 2 8 56 1.80 57 10 
Stoke City 100 67 6 9 54 1.74 57 9 
Crystal Palace 99 68 8 10 48 1.90 52 13 
Everton 126 78 -4 11 47 2.77 46 16 
West Ham Utd 122 73 3 12 47 2.53 48 14 
West 
Bromwich 
96 70 4 13 44 2.09 46 15 
Leicester City 104 67 26 14 41 1.90 55 11 
Newcastle Utd 129 65 36 15 39 2.38 54 12 
Aston Villa 113 87 -28 16 38 3.71 30 19 
Sunderland 101 77 -25 17 38 3.32 30 18 
Hull City 84 56 12 18 35 2.06 41 17 
Burnley 79 29 35 19 33 1.33 59 8 
QPR 86 73 -46 20 30 4.40 20 20 
TOTAL 3,348 2,054 113           
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Queens Park Rangers also records the highest cost per point penalized by only 30 points in the 
ranking and by the huge loss. 
Arsenal wins the FFP ranking with 81 points, the same points of Manchester City but with a 
higher profit before taxes (value taken as reference in case of same score). 
Due to good economic results in the first ten positions sporting results reflect FFP results with 
the exception of Burnley. Relegated in the field, it improves its position on the table league up 
to the 8th place thanks to incredible earnings before taxes of £ 35 mln.  
Newcastle and Sunderland relegate in Championship League with respect to the real ranking 
due to a negative economic statement. 
 
 
 
Source: Annual Review of Football Finance 2017; www.tifosobilanciato.it16 
 
Leicester City wins the Premier League title in one of the greatest sporting stories of all time.  
                                                 
16 https://www.tifosobilanciato.it/2017/05/06/english-premier-league-conti-delle-squadre-nella-passata-stagione/ 
 
CLUB OUTCOME WAGES EBT RANK POINTS 
COST 
PER 
POINT 
FFP 
POINTS 
FFP 
RANK 
Leicester City 128.7 80.4 1 1 81 1.58 82 2 
Arsenal 347.4 195.4 2.9 2 71 4.85 72 4 
Tottenham 209.8 100 38.5 3 70 2.45 86 1 
Manchester City 391.8 197.8 19.6 4 66 5.64 69 5 
Manchester 
United 
515.3 232.2 48.8 5 66 7.07 73 3 
Southampton 124.3 84.9 5.9 6 63 1.88 66 6 
West Ham 142.1 84.6 -4.5 7 62 2.36 60 7 
Liverpool 301.8 208.3 -19.8 8 60 5.36 56 8 
Stoke City 104.2 82.3 2.1 9 51 2.00 52 9 
Chelsea 329.1 222.4 -69.8 10 50 7.98 41 15 
Everton 121.5 84 -24.3 11 47 3.10 39 17 
Swansea City 97.2 81.8 -14.6 12 47 2.38 41 14 
Watford 94.4 57.9 3.6 13 45 2.02 47 10 
West Bromwich 
Albion 
98.3 73.7 1.2 14 43 2.26 44 12 
Crystal Palace 101.8 80.6 -6.9 15 42 2.59 39 16 
AFC 
Bournemouth 
87.9 59.6 3.4 16 42 2.01 44 11 
Sunderlan 108.1 83.9 -33 17 39 3.62 30 19 
Newcastle 125.8 74.7 4.2 18 37 3.29 38 18 
Norwich City 97.8 67.2 19 19 34 2.32 42 13 
Aston Villa 108.8 93 -80.7 20 17 1.15 10 20 
TOTAL 3,636.1 2,244.7 -103.4      
Premier League 2015/16 (‘000£) 
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It has lost only three league games in what has been described as a "fairytale" and the "most 
unlikely triumph in the history of team sport". 
Premier League club accounts for the 2015-16 season show an overall state of health in terms 
of turnover and wealth. Profitability suffers for the negative results of Chelsea and Aston Villa 
due to the accounting for some extraordinary transactions. 
The club with the biggest loss is the Aston Villa with £ 80,7 mln. On Chelsea's 2015/16 budget 
weighs two heavily anticipated contractual resolutions. The first with Mourinho for £ 8.3 mln 
and the second with 'Adidas' for £ 67 mln. In 2015/16, Aston Villa made an impairment loss of 
£ 34.8 mln. 
Net sales of 2015/16 compared with 2014/15 increased by 8.7% or increasing by £ 288 mln to 
a record £ 3.6 billion in 2015/16.  
Among the 17 clubs that were in the Premier League in both 2014/15 and 2015/16, the club 
which had the largest revenue, Manchester United, was also the fastest growing in 2015/16.  
Revenue growth of £120m (30%) was principally due to their reported £ 75 mln per year kit 
deal with adidas. Manchester City generated the largest revenue increase (£ 40 mln) among the 
others 16 clubs. 
Premier League clubs’ wage costs continued to grow in 2015/16, reaching £ 2,2 billion for an 
increase of 9%. 
The 17 clubs present in both the 2014/15 and 2015/16 Premier League seasons increased wage 
costs by an average of £ 13 mln each. Liverpool (£ 42 mln) and Manchester United (£ 37 mln) 
has the largest increases. As a result, Manchester United replaces Chelsea as the divisions’s 
highest wage payer. 
Seven Premier League clubs have a wage/revenue ratio in excess of 70% which is the indicative 
warning threshold level used by UEFA as part of their Financial Fair Play Regulations. This is 
an increase from six clubs in 2014/15. Leicester City, who ranked 15th in wage costs, 
outperformed their wage spending to an extent never achieved before in the Premier League 
history. 
The first nine positions of the real rank are the same of the FFP rank, but with different 
positioning. Leicester and Tottenham change with each other the first position. Manchester 
United overcome Manchester City rivals, arriving in third position. Arsenal moves from second 
to fourth place. 
There is also a surprise for this season called Norwich City. Relegated in the field, thanks to a 
consistent earnings before taxes of £ 19 mln, it improves its position until 13th place,ì obtainig 
the salvation in the FFP ranking. 
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As a conclusion, the Premier League final classification 2015/16 has denied the thesis that "wins 
who bills more". 
In terms of domestic football Leicester City winning the Premier League is the greatest 
achievement ever and I think it will never be surpassed. 
1.3.3 FFP FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
The FFP was born with a positive idea as its base. At a time when Europe experienced severe 
financial difficulties that led credit institutions, banks and states to bankruptcy, the football 
system had to be somewhat controlled. 
Over the past decade the expenses incurred by the presidents and the heavy debt exposure 
towards the banks were sending the community a counter-current message to a sport based on 
strong positive values. 
Self-sustainment, based on generating internally revenue that covers its costs, is a necessary but 
insufficient condition. 
The new regulation not only aims to spend less but rather it is an invitation to spend better. This 
means avoiding crazy spending on players transfers, reserving important infrastructure 
investments such as stadiums and training centers or the youth sector. 
The goal every company should look for is to seek new sources of earnings and not rely solely 
on capital gains. Although these line items are more ordinary than extraordinary in football, 
these can not be considered reliable and consistent sources of income as they vary from season 
to season based on players performance. 
Selling the best players to balance the budget also has negative consequences on sports results. 
It is also well known how the sporting results influence the economic ones. In football the rule 
is "the more you win, the more profitable you are". 
Team leaders have several tools available to increase their revenue. The main street leads to the 
construction of a owned stadium which is considered a true corporate solution. Many 
advantages will result from having a stadium. Fans who are most involved and stimulated to go 
to see the matches and thus more ticketing revenue; the stadium name divestiture, called naming 
rights, in exchange of multi-million-dollar sponsorships; organization of meeting, concerts and 
theme nights along with commercial services such as restaurants, bars and shops. 
Therefore, in many cases a stadium can change the face of a whole geographic area, both sporty 
and economic-social. 
 
Another key parameter to be assessed is indebtedeness. Nowadays some clubs, who are 
spending a lot of money (probably too much) thanks to the unlimited funds of their owners 
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(Manchester City and PSG) do not have any unpaid debts to third parties. Others, assaulted by 
their creditors, are forced to sell their best players each year to reach break-even results. While 
in the first case football companies are under UEFA control or affected by millionaire fines, a 
highly conciliatory attitude towards highly-debited clubs is at stake. 
Two examples are PSG and Atletico Madrid. 
The french team, which does not have any bank debt position, spent more than € 400 million in 
the 2017’s summer market session to buy Neymar and Mbappe and paid respectively € 222 and 
€ 180 mln. UEFA’s decision to verify PSG's accounts was obviously immediate. We are waiting 
for feedback and consequences, forecasted for 2018. 
Different is the case of Atletico Madrid. The Spanish club lives in a situation of strong corporate 
uncertainty linked to the level of indebtedness both to lenders and to the tax authorities. The 
club is therefore often forced to surrender the best players to settle the budget accounts. 
The difference with respect to the first case is UEFA’s softer position towards Atletico Madrid 
situation even with the high level of indebtedness.  
In 2016 FIFA banned Atletico Madrid from registering new signings for the next two transfer 
windows for breaching its rules on the international transfer and registration of players aged 
under 18 in addition to a few milion euros fine. 
Some corporate models provide strong initial investments to achieve over the years not only 
technical but also financial wellbeing. Assessing club’s expenses over a two-to-three years 
period is likely to be a mistake given that some business plans require, especially initially, 
longer implementation times. AC Milan is a case. Following the change of ownership in 2017 
the company immediately made strong investments in the market exceeding € 200 mln. Here 
again UEFA has decided to investigate. 
Milan has been free for the last three years because it has never qualified for a European 
competition. However, in the last season (2016/17) Milan has qualified for the European 
League and now the club has to comply with the FFP rules. It is already known that the company 
is far beyond the limits of allowed losses due to the debts accumulated in the last seasons. For 
companies with accounts not in line with FFP and which have recently changed ownership, 
UEFA allows the adoption of an investment plan - the Voluntary Agreement - which should 
allow the club to go back to the FFP parameters in five years instead of three avoiding penalties. 
In the case of Milan losses are considered a certainty in the coming season. If the company did 
not comply with the predictions provided, UEFA sanctions would be even harder. 
The Voluntary Agreement presented by the Chinese ownership of Milan provides for a total of 
€ 524 mln in revenue for the next five years. Part of the revenue should come from "Milan 
China" which is a newly founded company that will promote Milan in China and other Asian 
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countries with the goal of attracting new investors and increasing the Asian club business. The 
rest will depend on the results that the team will achieve, that is qualify for the Champions 
League in the next two seasons to allow the company to recuperate the expenses. UEFA, after 
receiving the documentation, asked Milan to make more detailed forecasts and postponed 
everything to October 2017. 
With these predetermined time constraints it becomes difficult for an investor to enter the 
football business and drive a smaller club to success. 
At the time it seems that UEFA is concerned about preserving the position of the main clubs 
rather than the health of the football system. Having new investors ready to make available new 
and important football resources might have great importance to the community. Just consider 
of the employment a businessman or entrepreneur might create. 
Therefore, everything should be done not to discourage the entry of these lenders with too 
drastic regulations and rather favoring their medium to long-term investments. 
In conclusion, FFP is likely to change football club business model in term of more innovative 
stadium and facilities, lower wages, more investments in the youth sector, more efficient 
scouting activit, capable managers, balanced championship, flexible contract, lower number of 
players per team, new revenue sources and a lower importance of the so called “patron”. The 
position of the patron or sponsor won’t disappear but it may be referred only to so called “noble 
costs”, related to youth team development and facilities.  
 
1.4 AMERICAN SOCCER MODEL 
The sporting result as a primary objective involves the entire European sports sector from its 
origin and it is considered as a driving element on which we have based the development of 
football system. 
However, this mentality can not be defined as typical of any culture, ie the pursuit of the 
sporting goal is not seen in every part of the world as the primary purpose. In fact, the USA 
conceive sporting competition completely different from the Europeans. 
The American model differs considerably, both in culture and organization, from the European 
one. 
On the European continent there is a pyramid hierarchical organizational model structured 
according to a system of national sports federations which in turn are associated with European 
and international federations. 
The federations have the task of promoting, regulating and organizing the national, European 
and international sporting activities of the national sports discipline through the promotion of 
championships traditionally focused on a promotion - relocation mechanism. 
23 
 
This structure should not be confused with the American ones which, due to the absence of a 
hierarchical system, is the core of each sporting activity. American sports leagues are not 
limited to the organization of championships and issuance of rules but they have a decisive 
manager at power in the field of resources for sporting activities. 
At the highest level we find the Major League followed by the Minor Leagues. In the case of 
football, the federation is called Major League Soccer (MLS). 
Formally, in the United States there is no figure of the amateur sportsman. The sportsman is 
only the athlete participating in professional leagues and the relationship between the first and 
the team owners is based on rigid rules imposing minimum wage base, some benefits, and above 
all a pay cap. 
The working relationship described is a source of justification for adopting a generally "closed" 
system (i.e. not structured on the promotion / retrocession mechanism) of the so-called 
franchisees.  
This system basically provides that all the teams participating in the league, even if they come 
last in the standings, have the right to resume the following year. The composition of the 
championship remains unchanged and the lower teams are not allowed to compete at high 
levels. The only way to join the league is to acquire the ownership of a club that already plays 
in the championship. 
The goal is to maintain the balance of competitiveness among the participating teams and to 
ensure the uncertainty of the sport result. In fact, the last classified teams are facilitated by the 
recognition of a pre-emption right in the choice of non-contractual players. This is to avoid 
creating a dominant abuse position and to protect the system. In Europe, however, the principle 
applies is the free market of players. 
In the USA redundancy cases or negative corporate budgets are rarer than in the European 
continent. 
In American sports culture football and sport in general are a mean to make profits and the 
sporting result is only a mean to get it (profit-oriented club). In European culture, on the other 
hand, it is a mean of achieving success (at all costs – utility-oriented club). For this reason 
American companies can not be compared to European ones. 
Let's take a look at the MLS business model in more detail. 
According to the latest ranking published by Univision, Bundesliga, Premier League, Liga, 
Serie A and Ligue A are, in that order, the most popular soccer championships in the world. 
However, opening the horizon of analysis, the MLS and the Chinese Superliga would even rank 
in front of the Italian Serie A. How is this possible? 
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The MLS we see today is radically different from the original one, resulting from two turning 
moments. The quarter-finals achieved by the US national team in the 2002’s World 
Championship and the arrival of David Beckham at LA Galaxy in 2007. 
Since 2002 there has been a continuous growth in the number of participating teams, spectators 
and revenue. 
Over time, marketing opportunities and visibility have attracted the interest of new investors 
and new owners ready to exploit the "soft power17" deriving from soccer. 
The football system vehicle used by MLS to market TV rights sales and sponsorships is called 
Soccer United Marketing. 
MLS growth is attributed to various factors, primarily to a widespread managerial approach at 
all levels and across the board, making the American league business-oriented. 
There is therefore a significant volume of foreign investment attracted by the system. 
Another success factor is the uncertainty of the result. The American model guarantees the 
competitiveness and contention of the league. The adoption of a "closed model", salary cap18 
and drafts19, although limited, allows each year all the franchises, at the starting ribbons, to 
aspire to the national title. 
In this way, some opportunities to increase the value of the championship get lost, although 
these choices are still justified today. MLS succeeds in generating television and sponsorship 
revenue (Audi, Adidas, Coca Cola) entering the system without going out. 
The "communitarian" American logic must not be neglected. For both cultural and utilitarian 
reasons, investments are calibrated to have an impact on the city's economy. 
Lastly, it is important to note that the football movement has managed to “build” a football 
culture so far unknown in the USA. 
Personally, the American championship has wide growth margins. The areas where the MLS 
should intervene to increase the value of the tournament could be the following. Increasing the 
number of franchises; building new stadiums to welcome and give the audience the best 
experience, exploiting commercially-induced and improve the average quality of teams. 
Nowadays, teams are protagonists of growth both in the long and in the short run but teams 
themselves do not rank at top European levels for revenue, profitability, valuation and brand 
value. 
                                                 
17 A persuasive approach to international relations, typically involving the use of economic or cultural influence. 
18 In professional sports, a salary cap (or wage cap) is an agreement or rule that places a limit on the amount of money that a 
team can spend on players' salaries. It exists as a per-player limit or a total limit for the team's roster, or both (Wikipedia). 
19 The MLS draft is an annual event, taking place in January of each year, in which the teams of Major League Soccer select 
players who have graduated from college or otherwise been signed by the league. (Wikipedia). 
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Another solution could be to increase the salary cap to avoid too much disparity between the 
earnings of players. 
However, the real node is due to the lack of a defined and quality "product" to limit investment 
and to generate revenue. The technical quality, the players and the technical staff sare certainly 
inferior to the European top leagues. This is reflected both on the field and outside. 
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CHAPTER 2 - BUSINESS MODEL 
2.1 GOVERNANCE MODEL AND MANAGEMENT - OPEN VS CLOSED MODEL 
In the football world the schemes and game principles have always been fundamental for a 
team. However, as football is becoming more and more a business phenomenon, the corporate 
aspect and the relevant governance model adopted are also becoming relevant. This can be 
described as the club’s game plan. 
There are various types of governance systems that are the result of different views about the 
nature and purpose of clubs. Two macrolevels can be considered: 
1. Closed model - The company's control bodies are in the hands of controlling 
shareholders (often one person only). Power is therefore concentrated in the hands 
of a few persons who also confer risk capital. The motivations that induce a person 
to invest in such a way in a football club are personal fulfillment (a result of sport, 
prestige, social visibility), direct or indirect economic return (the latter consists of 
gains stemming from entrepreneurial activity with respect to which football 
visibility plays an important role). This model is typical in England and Italy. 
Italian football got the best results both nationally and internationally when patrons 
were ready to invest. However, the evolution of the system is leading the closed 
model into crisis as costs are higher than revenue and the presidents are no longer 
able to cover the losses. 
2. Open model - Club's internal bodies are formed by other parties and not only by the 
majority shareholder. This is because a majority shareholder is not always needed, 
because there are other figures besides the members in the governing bodies. This 
model does not influence the economic aspect but it is an example of collective, 
sporting or socio-cultural interests. Usually this pattern is identified with the 
expression "popular stock" and is typical of Germany and Spain. 
In fact, while profit was introduced in Europe in the ‘90s, in Germany it was decided 
that 50% + 1 of the capital should belong to sports associations (with a relative 50% 
+1 of the voting power – Bayern Monaco’s and Hamburg’s case) with the exception 
of clubs that on 1 January 1999 proved to have had a fixed ownership over the last 
20 years (Wolfsburg and Bayer Leverkusen only).  
 
Based on the major European football championships, four main management models can be 
elaborated: 
1. Public business model - It refers to large companies listed on the stock exchange. 
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Everyone can buy shares including the fans. Usually most stocks are in the hands of 
a few members who control the club making the most important decisions. There is 
a great need for transparency and clarity of programs, as the company is open to the 
public. Examples of this model are English clubs. Tottenham, Manchester United 
and Arsenal above all. In Italy there are Juventus, Roma and Lazio (Italian stock 
exchange). Other companies with this model are Borussia Dortmund (Frankfurt 
Deutsche Borse) and Olympique Lyonnais (NYSE Euronext, Paris stock market). 
This can be considered a closed model. 
The positive aspect is the ability to find new financial flows more easily. The 
downside is that sporting results may take a back seat with respect to financial 
results. 
2. It’s my party model - This is the basic model held by a single owner. It is the so-
called patron, very wealthy and powerful, who manages the company in a direct way 
as its own company injecting great financial resources. Examples are Chelsea (run 
by Russian magnate Abramovich) and both Milan and Inter (once managed by 
Berlusconi and Moratti respectively) now owned by Chinese investors. Others are 
Manchester City and PSG owned by Arab Sheikhs. 
The positive side is the great financial resources available to the owner ready to do 
anything to get the best players performance. It is the same owners who replenish 
the budget losses with their own equity. 
The downside is that often these wealthy owners act too individually without 
considering any external advice. The biggest risk is the loss of business continuity 
(ongoing principle) as the owner may decide to get out of the club overnight leaving 
it in financial trouble. Also this model can be considered a closed one. 
3. A popular club model - It is the most classic form of open model and is based on the 
low-denomination shares. The club consists of a large number of members who lend 
the necessary resources and have voting right. They elect a chairman and a board of 
directors dealing directly with the management of the company. The main examples 
are, in addition to the German clubs mentioned above, the Spanish teams where 
Barcelona and Real Madrid can count on thousands of members. 
The positive side concerns the passionate character of the model and the affection 
of the fans. This means that football comes before profit. 
The downside is the ongoing changes in the organization chart which may modify 
the strategic direction already undertaken. Democracy, moreover, may end up 
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bringing a club presidency not appreciated by the proponents unanimously creating 
tense situations. 
4. A family affair model - It is related to small clubs that are associated with family-
run businesses. The president of this club invests family resources and manage the 
business directly assisted by a few other individuals. 
The positive side is the presidents’ passion, who serve their own interests. 
The downside concerns the difficulties that can be found in the current market that 
requires sudden strategic changes that these presidents do not accept or disregard. 
Nowadays, in football made up of budgets, financial transactions and huge 
international capital, this is the most troubled model. 
 
The achievement of the goals set by a company is entrusted to the management area defined as 
the system responsible for managing and coordinating the business units and their functions. 
It is up to managers to organize and direct the corporate system, plan strategies, organize 
coordinate and control internal activities and verify the results achieved during the year and 
making the necessary changes. 
The concept of strategic orientation is understood as the action line through which managers 
try to reach goals set by the top management. 
In other words it defines what the company wants to do, how it wants to do it and why. 
Even football organizations use management techniques to better structure the activity. These 
functions are usually carried out by a chairmanship made up by the chairman who is supported 
by the chief executive officer, the sports director and the secretary of the board; the commercial 
apparatus is entrusted to a team of marketing and communication personnel. 
A well-defined division of roles and tasks is therefore necessary: everything revolves around 
the concept of corporate organization. 
The organizational and internal management model adopted by leading international football 
clubs for the management of the technical area involves the presence of staff selected by the 
Board of Directors or directly by the Chairman himself, who has his most important position as 
the sports director. 
This is a professional whose tasks are the organization of the team technical staff, supervising 
sports activities and constantly upgrading management and corporate leadership, the 
coordination of relations between the management and the team and working in tune with the 
coach. 
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In addition it is the person who, on the basis of the manager's and the company's directions, is 
responsible for conducting the players negotiations, by contacting the related involved clubs 
and the intermediaries who directly managed the interests of the players. 
For better performance of the technical area it is therefore crucial that a direct synergy between 
a direct sportsman and a coach is created on the basis of an aligned vision of the strategies in 
order to achieve the common goals set by the company leaders. 
Regarding Italian regulations, the federation has dedicated to sports directors a special 
discipline, issuing in 1991 Special Rules for the list of Sports Directors and making mandatory 
to register at the relevant bar for the activity. 
A special management has been adopted in England where field issues are often solely 
attributed to the coach who is the so-called footbal manager. It deals with the most important 
activities, recruiting young people for the first team, the youth sector and other activities related 
to the management of the technical structure. 
We can define this figure as the undisputed leader of the technical-sports area as being the 
manager of everything that matters to him. He deals not only with the technical aspects, but 
also with the management of the budget for the transfers market by conducting the negotiations 
in person, directly supervising the medical and physiotherapy center as well as managing 
scouting activities. He is a true human and financial resource manager who tends to focus all 
responsibilities on himself. 
Examples of famous football managers are Arsene Wenger, current Arsenal coach, and Sir Alex 
Ferguson, former Manchester United coach. 
 
2.2 MAIN REVENUES AND COSTS 
In today's context, football clubs are focusing not only on sports but also on budget outcomes. 
It is therefore a necessity to study new ways of earning so as to increase revenue and try to 
reach self-financing from the perspective of economic management. 
The imperative now is to look for a long-term economic-financial balance and afford to buy 
players capable of achieving sports goals expected by fans. 
Compared to the past gate receipts remain an important component but are no longer the only 
source of earnings. Executives are increasingly implementing strategies trying to maximize the 
brand's value so as to open up new markets. 
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2.2.1 REVENUES AND TRENDS 
In the football sector the sources of revenue are conventionally divided into three macro-areas: 
1) Multimedia rights and broadcasting - Revenue from the sale of traditional radio and 
television rights including rights related to new technologies; 
2) Matchday revenue - Revenue from the stadium during the team matches. 
3) Business activities - Sponsorships and merchandising activities. 
 
Media rights represent the benefit of broadcasting and transmitting football matches on live or 
deferred platforms or on any media platform.  
This type of revenue has facilitated the revolution of a system allowing the clubs to increase 
their financial resources with respect to the past and attract more and more viewers everywhere 
in the world. 
Football clubs sell these rights to communication companies. These rights can be divided into: 
- Traditional - They concern radio and television rights (free-to-air tv, pay-tv, pay-
per-view or digital terrestrial) 
- Innovative - Rights transmitted via Internet and Smartphones. 
Broadcasting is one of the most important revenue items especially for Italian clubs, which 
survive mainly through them. The individual club’s ability to influence this income component 
is often limited, as the value of a league’s media rights in impacted by several market-specific 
factors such as league/product appeal, market size (i.e. number of TV households), consumers’ 
spending power, level of competition among media rights holders and pay-tv penetration rate. 
Furthermore, the levelof broadcasting revenue generated by a club is also influenced by the 
revenue distribution method applied by each national league as well as by UEFA. 
The bargaining can take place in two forms: 
- Individual sale - Individual clubs sign agreements with the various TV broadcasters; 
this formula satisfies above all the owners of the big teams, which have more 
favorable economic conditions than the lower teams in the championship; 
- Collective sale - It is performed jointly by the Serie A football league. The league 
leaders deal with the sale of rights on behalf of all clubs; afterwards, earnings are 
fairly and partly divided between the teams and the remainder proportionally 
distributed according to the catchment area each organisation has. 
In Italy, the Legislative Decree 9/2008 regulates the sale of television rights, best known as 
Melandri-Gentiloni Law20. 
                                                 
20 http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/deleghe/08009dl.htm  
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It provides collective sale of television rights. The organizer of the competition (the League) 
becomes co-owner, together with the participants in the competition, of the audiovisual rights 
governed by decree. 
The proceeds from the collective sale of TV rights are divided according to the following 
criteria: 
- 40% in equal parts among all teams; 
- 30% on the basis of the sports results achieved: 10% according to the results 
achieved by each team from the season 1946/47, 15% based on the last 5 seasons’ 
results and the remaining 5% based on the last championship; 
- 30% according to the catchment area: 25% determined by the number of supporters 
of each team identified by one or more Seria A league researches and 5% according 
to the population of the reference community. 
 
Revenue from broadcasting rights are still the Value of production21 main component for Italian 
clubs. The TV revenue income component, thanks to good performance in the European 
competitions during the last seasons, has grown from 37% of 2013/14 to 42% of 2014/15 and 
up to 40% of the last season 2015/16 total turnover.  
According to Report Calcio 2017, the chart below shows the TV rights Italian trend over the 
last few years22. 
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Among the five major European championships the collective selling formula prevails today. 
The Spanish championship is the last in terms of time to have adopted the collective sale in 
2016. 
                                                 
21 It is the sum of all the values that compose the letter A of the income statement. 
22 Report Calcio 2017  
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32 
 
With Real Law Decreen n. 5/2015, the Spanish league aligned with measures taken by other 
European leagues in the past, abandoning definitively the "individual" sale rights mechanism 
that allowed Barcelona and Real Madrid to gain the beauty of 40% of global television rights, 
that are about 755 million per year23. 
Both Barcelona and Real Madrid did not oppose the decree because, with this new distribution 
of TV rights, they may increase their revenue. At the same time the two rivals would benefit by 
cooperating (as they have always done), being strongly favored with individual bargaining 
rights that allow them to maintain the full amount stipulated without the obligation of 
subdividing it with other clubs. 
Obviously, this policy has always created a situation of great imbalance: in the 2013/14 season, 
Real Madrid and Barcelona accounted for nearly 50% of the total sum of TV rights. This is why 
the Spanish government has issued a decree authorizing the centralized sale of television rights 
from 2016 to 2019. 
The overall figure will be reserved 90% for the Liga, while the remaining 10% will be  attributed 
to Liga Adelante, the Spanish Serie B. 
As reported by Calcio e Finanza, four distribution criteria will be adopted: 
- 50% divided into equal parts; 
- A share based on the sports results; 
- A share based on the sale of subscriptions and tickets; 
- Finally, the remaining stake based on the team's contribution to the championship's 
visibility. The text does not say it clearly, but it is reasonable to think that this is a 
criterion similar to our catchment area. 
In order not to favor too much Real Madrid and Barcelona, no team can receive more than 20% 
of the total for each of the last two criteria, and the "first-to-last" ratio must not be more than 
4.5 times24.  
According to some industry experts, the centralized sale of the rights would allow the Liga to 
generate revenue of € 1,5 billion annually thus doubling the total figure that has been collected 
with the individual selling system in recent years25. 
Also for English Premier League television rights are the basic revenue source. 
Looking at the European figures, the Premier League generated in 2015/16 season broadcasting 
revenue of € 2,577 mln and outperformed the other “big fives”. Germany recorded TV revenue 
for € 933 mln, Spain € 1,232 mln, Italy € 1,199 million and lastly France with € 656 million26. 
                                                 
23 http://www.calcioefinanza.it/2015/05/02/liga-dal-2016-al-via-vendita-centralizzata-dei-diritti-tv/  
24 http://www.calcioefinanza.it/2016/03/31/diritti-tv-liga-nuova-legge-real-barca-atletico/  
25 Ibidem note 19 
26 Deloitte Annual Review of Football Finance 2017 
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The latter is the championship with the highest growth margins after PSG's recent purchase of 
Neymar in the 2017 summer transfer market window27. Hence, the landscape seems more 
challenging for France right now. Maximising media revenue domestically becomes more 
important for leagues that are less appealing to global audiences.  
 
Matchday revenue is the sum of revenue corresponding to matches. 
It concerns the direct use of the stadium in championship or cup games and therefore falls 
outside of television rights and other revenue streams. 
This consists of three subcategories: 
- Tickets and subscriptions, considering the classic stadium revenue received in 
advance compared to the delivery of the service directly on the matchday, through 
the tickets sale at the box office; 
- Food and beverage, i.e. the management of food and beverage services for the 
public in the stadium; 
- Corporate hospitality covers all the spaces and initiatives within the stadium that 
the company can exploit before, during and after the game. It can be divided in 
hospitalities areas and executives boxes. The first is the indoor stadium halls with a 
view of the pitch set up for normal private fans, offering high-level catering and the 
ability to attend matches even on days when adverse weather conditions may occur. 
The second relates to premises set up by the companies which the club has business 
relations with in order to organize meetings and dinners. Hospitality areas and 
executive boxes probably represent the avantguard of sport services linked to the 
stadium. 
According to Report Calcio 2017, the chart below shows the gate receipts Italian trend28. 
                                                 
27 The current contract brings into the French Championships around € 730 million euros annually, and will expire in 2020. 
However, Ligue 1, according to Bloomberg (business and markets newspaper), is already trying to revise upwards the next 
contract: the goal is to cash in about 1.2 billion euros annually, an increase of around 500 million a year. Pointing in 
particular on Neymar who can become (if not already) the man's image of the entire French championship. 
28 Report calcio 2017 
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The European background shows a net lead advantage on Premier League. In 2015/16 the 
English championship generated matchday revenue for € 831 mln, far away from the other two 
big nations in term of stadium revenue Germany and Spain respectively with € 528 mln and € 
500 mln. In last positions were Italy and France with only € 204 mln and € 164 mln. 
  
Business activities is the set of merchandising activities and sponsorship that clubs are able to 
develop. 
Merchandising refers to the marketing of products through the organisation's name or brand 
that can be directly connected to the soccer world such as T-shirts, scarves, caps, flags, 
jewelery used every day as keychains and wallets.  
These products are often linked to services such as credit cards and ATMs. 
On this type of revenue ENGLISH teams are very open as they can count on thousands of 
passionate and scattered fans around the world, willing to spend big sums each year to find their 
team's products on the market. 
Merchandising is a neglected source of revenue for Italian clubs with a very low turnover rate. 
There are two main reasons. On one hand, Italian companies are still slaves of piracy. On the 
other this is due to a kind of cultural attitude that leads people to spend more for fashion clothes 
than for their own football team's products. 
In general, the football sector has huge potential profits because it can leverage on the team-to-
fan tie. 
In this branch, merchandising is associated with Manchester United. The English club is the 
most important and successful example in the industry and its strategies are often taken as a 
point of reference by other clubs. 
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Red Devils specific feature is the marketing of their own products (direct management), which 
are commissioned to third parties and sold through both their stores and through the Internet 
site. 
An example is Manchester United Cola which is a drink that is served to fans during matches 
and catering at the stadium. 
Instead Italian companies prefere to outsource all brand management (indirect management) to 
third companies by choosing outsourcing solutions for all services from manufacture to product 
marketing. 
These companies buy the trademark by paying proportional royalties to the soccer company in 
relation to the sales made. 
 
Sponsorships also play an important role in term of revenue. 
Entrepreneurs are strongly attracted to the football business. Companies and players have a 
strong propaganda power needed to reach directly the final consumer. 
Many multinationals use their partnerships with teams to associate their brand with positive 
values such as sports. 
Sponsors can be classified in different types: 
- The main sponsor – it is the official sponsor of the organisation and the one that 
appears on the T-shirts; 
- The technical sponsor - in this case there is a company that supplies all the technical 
sports material (T-shirts, balloons etc), putting its name on it; 
- Institutional sponsors and official suppliers - companies that link their name to the 
team whose brand will appear in both advertising boards during matches as well as 
on meetings, tournaments, or other events. 
A modern form of sponsorship is naming rights (already mentioned). It is about giving to big 
companies the right of associating their names with sports facilities such as stadiums or training 
centers in exchange for huge amount of money. 
There are many corporations that decide to make these strong investments so they can sponsor 
these great “cathedrals” for a long time. 
Some companies agree with clubs when building the stadium. It is the case of Arsenal who 
decided to sign a commercial partnership with Emirates for the construction of the new facility. 
The Arsenal’s new stadium is now named Emirates Stadium.  
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Looking at Serie A, the graphic below shows last years’ situation29 (figures in thousand of 
euros). 
 
This item has seen a weak but steady increase in recent years. 
To be noted is the significant increase in the last 2015/16 seasons when revenue increased by 
14.9%30. This is a sign of a greater and more entrepreneurial dynamism although the figure is 
far from the performance achieved by the major european clubs. 
Real Madrid, Barcelona, Manchester United and Chelsea are the teams who benefit the most 
from that revenue. 
At the level of main sponsor Real Madrid ranks in first position. According to reports from 
Palco2331, an Iberian web magazine specializing in business sports, the club chaired by 
Florentino Perez would is about to sign the renewal of the sponsorship agreement with Emirates 
one year ahead of schedule. 
The new agreement with Emirates will expire at the end of the season 2021/22 and will allow 
Real Madrid to collect around € 70 mln every year. The European champions in charge will 
collect more than Barcelona which collects about € 55 mln per year with Rakuten32 and 
Manchester United whose agreement with General Motors (Chevrolet) can count on € 62 mln 
per season33. 
                                                 
29 Revenue from sponsorship and other business activities refer to revenue from: official sponsor, technical sponsor, other 
sponsors, merchandising, royalties and advertising activities (Report calcio 2017 FIGC) 
30 Report calcio 2017 
31 https://www.palco23.com/clubes/el-madrid-vuela-alto-emirates-pagara-70-millones-al-ano-hasta-2022.html  
32 Rakuten is a Japanese electronic commerce and Internet company based in Tokyo and founded in 1997 by Hiroshi 
Mikitani. Its B2B2C e-commerce platform, Rakuten Ichiba, is the largest e-commerce site in Japan and among the world’s 
largest by sales. The company operates Japan's biggest Internet bank and third-largest credit card company (by transaction 
value). It also offers e-commerce, fintech, digital content and communications services to over 1 billion members around the 
world, and operates in 29 countries and regions (Source: wikipedia). 
33 http://www.calcioefinanza.it/2017/09/21/rinnovo-sponsorizzazione-emirates-real-madrid-70-milioni-2022/  
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Also concerning the technical sponsor the figures are dazzling, with Real Madrid always on the 
top. 
The negotiations between Real Madrid and Adidas for the renewal of technical sponsorship is 
still going on.  
The agreement signed in 2012 with expiration in 2020 guarantees the Blancos only € 40 mln. 
Also in the face of Blancos international successes of recent years (three Champions Leagues 
won in the last four competition editions), Florentino Perez aims to increase significantly the 
economic part of the contract. According to rumors34, the Spanish club and the German 
sportswear company have reached an agreement around a figure higher than € 150 mln a season 
with the agreement extended until 2031. 
Adidas is also Manchster United’s technical sponsor. The agreement, signed in 2015, will last 
for ten years. The German company will pay Red Devils € 90 mln per season, plus a variable 
amount depending on the sports results. 
The relationship between Barcelona and Nike, together since 1998, continues with success and 
great satisfaction on both sides. The technical sponsor has decided to renew for another ten 
years the partnership with the Spanish club. The agreement, valid from the 2018/19 season, will 
allow a gain of at least € 150 mln a season until 2028 with a possible extension until 203135. 
Since 2017, Chelsea will also dress in Nike36. It is a new decade-long agreement (the previous 
was with Adidas) that will bring to the Blues about € 75 mln per season, in addition to € 55 mln 
of Yokohama Tires, the main sponsor for the London team. 
 
These numbers demonstrate the importance of sponsors in the football world. These are not 
purely commercial agreements but true loyalty programs. Agreements are often signed on a 
multi-year basis demostrating how football vehicle draws major investors in the market. 
These numbers will rise and lead to a real upward race. We will see world market giants ready 
to offer more and more money to get a football market slice and all the resulting image benefits. 
With these sums teams are able to make investments in infrastructure and to ensure the 
performance of the best players. This totally demostrates how sports performance are linked to 
financial ones. The more you can get from sponsorship and merchandising the more you may 
directly invest in the transfer market and get immediately the best players. 
                                                 
34 http://www.calcioefinanza.it/2017/09/20/rinnovo-sponsorizzazione-adidas-real-madrid-2031/  
35 http://www.calcioefinanza.it/2016/10/31/rinnovo-partnership-barcellona-nike-fino-2028/  
36 http://www.calcioefinanza.it/2016/05/18/chelsea-nike-sponsor-75-milioni/  
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Usually best player means in turn better sports results and visibility, more money from TV 
broadcasting and further more and new possible sponsorship agreements. Hence, more money 
again, considered. A real vicious circle.  
Just think of Manchester United that with Ibrahimovich's only jersey sale has been able to 
finance Pogba's purchase from Juventus in 2016 for an amount higher than € 100 mln. 
 
In addition to the three main revenue items analyzed so far, we can add other revenue items 
such as capital gains from player transfers, grants related to income (contributions), and revenue 
attributable to the results obtained in national or international competitions. The latter is related 
to extraordinary nature items and is characterized by a certain degree of uncertainty as it is not 
foreseeable ex-ante. 
In particular, extraordinary revenue can be divided into two categories: 
1) The distribution of revenues related to the competitions organized by UEFA; 
2) The Parachute System 
The first category is related to UEFA's distribution of earnings from commercial and television 
contracts linked to the Champions League and the European League. 
Between the two competitions there are both technical and economic differences. The strongest 
teams of each nation and the most admired players by the fans take part in the Champions 
League. This results in greater visibility and therefore  higher revenue than those earned by 
companies participating in the European League. 
The basic criteria for the distribution of prizes are as follows. First, UEFA distributes equal 
shares among all the clubs participating in the competition; then there are so-called “bonus 
performance” sums related to the results achieved in the qualifying rounds that take place 
between September and December. To this the Market Pool system must be added. It combines 
the value of TV rights paid by the various broadcasters with the number of games played in 
Champions League per season and the position in the previous league. 
As for the second part of the competition, prizes increase each turn up to the victory of the cup. 
Looking at the 2016/17 season, UEFA has distributed € 1,7187 billion net of administrative and 
organizational expenses and the portion retained by UEFA as a profit. Of this sum € 1,269 
billion were distributed to the teams participating in the Champions League (in line with the 
amount of the previous season). 
Despite the defeat in the final against Real Madrid, Juventus earned even more money in the 
2016/17 Champions League season. 
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As a matter of fact, the Bianconeri have earned about € 109 million, which could have become 
about € 113 mln in case of success in Cardiff's challenge. Real Madrid, the final winner, has 
instead earned about € 80.9 million euros. 
Napoli, the other Italian team eliminated in the first knockout round by Real Madrid, earned 
Champions revenue for € 65 million37. 
For both Italian teams this revenue account for more than 20% of the total turnover. Thus this 
sum can be considered vital in the economy of Italian teams. This is the reason why the 
qualification in the Champions League is important to the CEOs of the Italian teams in order to 
increase the club's revenue and funding resources. 
Regarding the the second category of revenue we can define the Parachute System as a system 
of contributions where each year the clubs of the main continental football leagues provide 
financial aid for the teams drawn back into lower categories. 
This system of contributions was created with the aim of allowing for better medium and long-
term expenditure planning and avoiding the bankruptcy of certain clubs. 
2.2.2 COSTS AND TRENDS 
A feature that distinguishes football industry from all other economic sectors is the extremely 
high costs that clubs have to support and bear for the normal performance of the business or for 
strengthening the team. 
Four major expenses can be identified: 
1. Expenditure strictly related to sports activities such as the purchase of players and 
their remuneration; 
2. Costs for infrastructures related to stadiums and training centers; 
3. Costs for the commercial operations of the club such as shopping malls, shopping 
centers and tourist facilities; 
4. General costs such as administrative costs, legal fees, team transfers and tax 
burdens. 
 
The main football clubs expenses are definitely included in the first category: every year clubs 
seek to recruit the best players to reach greater goals. Here is the importance of both summer 
and winter football session. 
Over the last twenty years, and especially in the last 5-6 years, we have witnessed a steep 
increase in costs both for players’ registration rights and their salaries. 
                                                 
37 http://www.calcioefinanza.it/2017/06/04/ricavi-champions-league-2017-juventus-napoli/  
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Two factors have led to this increase. The first is the famous Bosman’s law, that since 1995, 
allowed players to move freely from one club to another at the expiration of the contract. 
The law has increased the contractual power of players, pushing club executives to increase 
wage bids and agree upon longer-term contracts to avoid losing players without a contract. 
The second factor is attributable to purely technical reasons. The greater number of 
commitments led the executives to contract a greater number of players than in the past. 
There has been a gradual increase in costs, especially in the case of job placements; labor costs 
are steadily rising and often achieving wages for individual players out of any logical reason. 
In the last summer market windows, in particular in 2016/17 and in 2017/18, impressive prices 
were paid for the purchase of football players as summarized in the table below. 
 
 Highest football players purchase (mln €)38 
FOOTBALLER SEASON BUYER PRICE 
Neymar 17/18 Paris Saint Germain 222 
Paul Pogba 16/17 Manchester United 105 
Ousmane Dembèlè 17/18 Barcellona 105 
Gareth Bale 13/14 Real Madrid 101 
Cristiano Ronaldo 09/10 Real Madrid 94 
Gonzalo Higuain 16/17 Juventus 90 
Neymar 13/14 Barcellona 88,2 
Romelu Lukaku 17/18 Manchester United 84,7 
Luis Suarez 14/15 Barcellona 81,72 
Angel Di Maria 14/15 Manchester United 75 
James Rodriguez 14/15 Real Madrid 75 
Kevin De Bruyne 15/16 Manchester City 74 
Zinedine Zidane 01/02 Real Madrid 73,5 
Naby Keita 18/19 Liverpool 70 
Zlatan Ibrahimovic 09/10 Barcellona 69,5 
Kaka 09/10 Real Madrid 65 
Edinson Cavani 13/14 Paris Saint Germain 64,5 
Angel Di Maria 15/16 Paris Saint Germain 63 
Raheem Sterling 15/16 Manchester City 62,5 
Alvaro Morata 17/18 Chelsea 62 
Luis Figo 00/01 Real Madrid 60 
Oscar 16/17 SIPG 60 
Anthony Martial 15/16 Manchester United 60 
Fernando Torres 10/11 Chelsea 58,5 
Benjamin Mendy 17/18 Manchester City 57,5 
                                                 
38 https://www.transfermarkt.it/statistik/transferrekorde  
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The table shows how prices are growing at an uncontrolled pace. 
Neymar is the most expensive player in football history. € 222 million was paid for his 
resignation clause by PSG in 2017 that has pledged to pay the player a € 30 million annual 
salaries for the next five seasons. 
The same PSG is the protagonist of the second most expensive negotiation in history, which is 
not included in the table above for reasons related to the formula adopted. The French club also 
acquired Kylian Mbappe, Monaco’s former player, with an operation of loan with right to 
purchase in 2018/19 for a price close to € 180 mln. At the same time, PSG will pay € 18 mln 
salary per season for the next five seasons. Just looking at these two transactions it is clear that 
costs are becoming outrageous. 
Even in football the rule adopted is that the market makes the price. As a result as long as there 
are clubs with important financial resources ready to spend such high prices to buy a footballer, 
they will continue to increase in the future. 
I personally think that the risk is to see situations where a club pays an excessive price compared 
to the actual value of the players only because the market has decided in that way. 
There are many cases of players who have not yet proved to be worth that amount of money, 
that were paid high prices only because other players, perhaps already successful, are paid the 
same price or little more. The underlying market logic is as follows. If team A sells a player fot 
100, why me, as team B, can not sell my good player at a fair price, maybe close to 100? This 
triggers a rise in the price chain that has led to the current situation. 
We can say the same for wages and salaries trends. 
Football players have a greater purchase power in term of wages and salaries negotiation. The 
logic is the same as for the price paid. If player A is able to get 10 as salaries, why can’t I as 
player B also get 10 as well with all things being equal? 
According to Report Calcio 2017, the chart below shows the Italian actual situation related to 
Serie A in term of all costs39. 
 
                                                 
39 Report calcio 2017 
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Personnel costs have increased once again after a few seasons characterized by an effort to 
reduce them. In absolute terms, employees costs shifted from € 1,235.6 mln in 2014/15 to € 
1,355.1 mln in 2015/16, with a increase of 9.7% over the previous season. The relation between 
employees costs and costs of production rises from 49% to 53%. Furthermore, the relation 
between employees costs and the value of production does not change but remains anchored at 
56%, but decreased from 80% to 78% when considering the ratio between overall personnel 
costs (labor costs and amortization) and net revenue40.  
Companies are adopting cost-saving policies because of the difficulties in increasing revenue. 
The clubs are trying to limit the excessive costs by introducing young players from the youth 
sector into their own first team. This allows the club to save on players’ registration and 
engagement of new successful players constantly seeking richer contracts. 
Another strategy is to sign a contract with incentives that are partially foxed and variable 
depending on both individual and team results. In this case if the player does not have a good 
return, the company will save some of the cost. 
 
We will now analyze the approach used by Real Madrid to manage the cost policy.  
Real Madrid has won most Champions League in history raising the trophy twelve times. 
Before the three successes over the last four years Real Madrid raised the Cup for the last time 
in 2002 (9th Cup). Theie celebration was doomed by the fixation with the obsession for the La 
Decima, since no team had ever won 10 Champions League. 
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From that moment on twelve years of disappointment went by and the dream for the 10th cup 
became a nightmare. 
In 2014 the wait finally ended when the Blancos, under the guidance of the Italian coach 
Ancelotti, managed to win the big ears cup challenging the rival Atletico Madrid. 
The Spanish club has always sought to achieve its goals by hiring the best players in the world, 
relying on strong revenue from broadcasting and endless fan base spread all over the world. 
In the 12 years before La Decima, Real Madrid touched the pharaonic amount of € 1 billion 
only for players’ registration. To this employees costs must be added. 
The Spanish team was the first to reach € 100 mln to buy a footballer. It happened in 2013 when 
the club bought Gareth Bale from Tottenham for € 101 mln. Already in 2009, however, the 
Blancos spent € 94 mln for Cristiano Ronaldo and € 65 mln for Kaka: this has probably triggered 
the whirlwind of uncontrolled hike in prices. 
With regard to salaries it is interesting to analyze the system adopted by Florentino Perez which 
is a system often subject to numerous criticisms. 
It should be noted that despite the strong compensation given to the superstars in the team, the 
total burden of this cost remains well-proportioned to the high turnover that the club achieves 
every year. 
The wagering policy is based on the status of player and not only from a technical point of 
view. It takes into account both the career achievements, the specific weight that its image has 
on the market and the benefits that its image can bring in terms of brand turnover and visibility. 
These parameters led to the following subdivision in 2016/17: 
- The range of players who won the gold ball or potential candidates for the gold ball, 
called stars. They are in the highest salary category which includes Cristiano 
Ronaldo and Gareth Bale on all; 
- The range of players considered internationally renowned stars, called key. They are 
at level just below the previous one which includes players able to determine the 
results of matches; 
- The range of intermediate players, known as medium. It includes players considered 
important but not essential to the project; 
- A group of young players, known as canteranos. It includes players who are facing 
the first team and young players who have grown up in the youth field. 
The chart below summarizes the situation in the 2016/17 season. 
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After the last contract renewal, Real Madrid has two of the highest paid stars in the world, 
Cristiano Ronaldo (€ 21 million net) and Bale (€ 15 million), who alone bring home 30% of the 
whole wage bill. 
The Blancos 4 stars (CR7, Bale, Ramos and Benzema) have a total wage bill higher than the 
one of the other players all together both absolute terms (+ 47% compared to key players) and 
on average (+ 120% compared to the second bracket players). 
While this method of managing the cost of labor and the chart above seem to show some 
disparity, on the other hand it allows Real Madrid to attract and keep stars that have led the club 
to the excellent recent results without missing an indispensable support from the top-level 
players cast (James, Kroos, Modric and Marcelo among the others). 
This system is the basis of Real Madrid's achievements, both for a motivational and business 
point of view. It does not waste money but players are paid based on their performance and 
image return. 
The amount due to each player is calculated in a way to get a higher return over the paid salary. 
This is a dynamic system in which the player’s position can be revised whenever a player has 
to renew his contract. If his performance improves, he can be promoted to a higher slot. 
It is a system that can strongly motivate players to give their best both for the good of the club 
and their own personal interests. Conversely, it may create issues in the locker room especially 
when the results are not in line with the initial expectations and expenses. 
 
Chart 1 – Wages of the team in 2016/17 (€ mln) 
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2.2.3 ECONOMIC CORRELATION BETWEEN COSTS AND REVENUE AND 
COMPARISONS 
Europe football aggregate revenue reached € 26,6 billion in 2015.  
The football industry goes against the flow in comparison with the current general economy. 
Between 2010 and 2014 the total revenue grew on average by 5% compared to the 2.3% of the 
European economy. 
The aggregate revenue of the clubs participating in the 54 European Top Divisions reached € 
16,9 billion in 2015, with an average combined growth rate of 9.3 %. 
Costs increased on average by just 3.3%, reducing of the total loss from € 1.7 billion in 2011 to 
€ 0.3 billion in 2015. The introduction of the UEFA Financial Fair Play regulations provided a 
fundamental contribution in achieving this result. Between 2011 and 2014 the operating income 
moved from € -0.4 to € +0.8 billion. 
In 2015 among the main 10 European Top Divisions Italy ranked fourth for average revenue (€ 
95.2 billion), behind England (€ 220.2 billion), Germany (€ 134.5 billion) and Spain (€ 102.5 
billion), and followed by France (€ 70.9 billion) and Russia (€ 46.3 billion). Broadcasting rights 
represent the main source of income for several leagues (Italy, England and Spain). Germany 
is an exception, as revenue from media rights represent only 34%, exceeded by sponsorship, 
advertising and other commercial incomes (41%). Gate receipts are significant for Germany 
(20%), Spain (20%) and England (16%), while for Italy and France represent only 11%41.  
The chart below shows the performance of the top 10 clubs in Europe. 
 
                                                 
41 Report Calcio 2017 
*/**others sports net proceeds 
***www.ecofoot.fr for estimates 
****www.thisisanfield.com for 
estimates 
Exchange GBP/EUR at 30/6/2015 = 1.3145 
Exchange GBP/EUR at 30/6/2016 = 1.1971 
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In relation to costs the incidence of the most relevant one (labor expenses) varies between 50% 
and 60% for Germany and Italy while it affects France, England and Spain for more than 60%. 
With respect to the previous season Italy reduced the amount of employee cost (11% reduction) 
while England and Spain increased it. 
Therefore, the overall net result is positive for England (€ 88 mln), Spain (€ 64 mln) and 
Germany (€ 73.8 million), while others continue to generate losses such as France and Italy (€ 
64 and € 292 mln respectively)42. 
Revenues and costs (especially employees costs) increase although losses have not risen as in 
previous years but are steadily declining. This has been possible through diversification 
policies, cost containment policies and capital gains from player alienation. From an economic 
point of view, we can say everything a part of a stagnant situation of the overall turnover 
generated by football world. 
The level of net aggregate loss does not depend on the economic crisis of recent years (the 
revenue of the football industry has indeed grown significantly) but it depends on the increase 
in costs that exceeds revenue. This led the total loss to a considerable deterioration until 2011 
followed by a reduction to our days. The crisis that characterizes football can therefore be 
attributed to real structural shortcomings. 
 
A revenue component that is getting more and more important is football players capital gain. 
In Italy higher revenues come from national TV rights and capital gains. Italian football 
sustainability can not count on these revenues since TV right do not represent a safe ground. If 
the interest diminished, the sums that guarantee these rights would also diminish. Regarding 
capital gains, some top players are all moved to other leagues while others are frying to move 
to Italian one. However, the dramatic increase in the prices of individual players, even those 
with modest or not yet proven skills, will tend to increase the importance of this item on the 
budget sales. This will probably allow to recover accounts and financial statement that would 
otherwise make loss, as abd even create profitable budget for well established clubs. These are 
uncertain income components whose amounts may vary from year to year and will therefore 
affect the club's profit and loss account increasingly. It is thus vital to diversify the sources of 
revenue. 
Italian and French league are those who benefits the most from these income component. 
Looking at the Italian situation, the chart below show the top football players capital gains. 
                                                 
42 Report Calcio 2017 
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Paul Pogba capital gain (Juventus former player) is not included in the list.  
He was sold to Manchester United in 2016 for more than € 110 mln after being bought for zero 
euros three summers before from Manchester United.  
Pogba's accounting value at 30 June 2016 in the Juventus’ balance sheet was € 4,708 mln. This 
is because despite he has been bought for free in the 2012 summer market the black and white 
club recorded the cost of commissions paid to Raiola for hiring Pogba (€ 1,635 million) and 
that cost for the renewal of his contract (€ 4.53 million in 2014/15 and another € 2 million in 
the first half of the 2015/16 season) subsequently amortized over the contract years (expiring 
on June 30, 2019). 
The capital gain that Juventus recorded in the financial statements at June 30, 2017 thanks to 
Paul Pogba sale to Manchester United for € 110 million (€ 72.6 mln net capital gain stated by 
Juventus) allowed the club to reach € 562 mln of revenue and a profit after taxes of € 42.6 mln. 
These are incredible results if compared to other Italian clubs. 
At European level the turnover achieved in 2017 places Juventus among the top positions. 
This shows how important capitan gain could be in term of performance and turnover, even 
more when prices increase. The more prices increase, the easier getting higher capital income 
will be. With only one good amount capital gain, clubs could fix their account and keep constant 
the level of costs (employees costs in particular), without turning to less sustainable policies. 
GREATER CAPITAL GAINS 2006-2016 
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As mentioned above, these entries are non-recurrent and have extraordinary nature. To rely too 
much on them is not a good choice for a sustainable business model.  
 
In terms of costs, the most important entry is the labor costs since the average cost of wages in 
the top 10 clubs is € 226,5 mln. 
According to Report Calcio 2016, the table below shows the employees costs of the top 10 
European clubs43. 
 
Employees costs 2014 - top 10 European clubs 
 
RANK CLUB 
EMPLOYEES COSTS 
(in mln) 
INCIDENCE ON 
REVENUE 
1 Real Madrid CF   270 49% 
2 Manchester United FC 263 51% 
3 FC Barcellona 248 51% 
4 Manchester City FC 245 59% 
5 Parsi Saint Germain FC 235 50% 
6 Chelsea FC 231 60% 
7 FC Bayern Monaco 218 45% 
8 Arsenal FC 199 55% 
9 Juventus FC 184 56% 
10 Liverpool FC 172 66% 
 
 
  
The cost of salaries along with depreciation and write-downs reaches 100% of the revenue in 
some cases. It is an unsustainable situation because many teams spend more than they invoice. 
In 2015, Italy and France had the highest employee cost / outcome ratio, respectively 69% and 
68% respectively. 
Going back a few years, just because the data deserve to be quoted, in 2012 Inter and Milan had 
a employees costs/ turnover ratio of 90% and 88%, respectively. 
At a distance of 4 years, this percentage has been considerably reduced: in 2016, Inter had a 
60% ratio while Milan 70%. 
However, the incidence of salaries is a constant in the European football model with the 
exception of Germany, where the growth of wage goes hand in hand with increasing incomes 
with an unchanged incidence. 
In 2015 Italy and France also had the lowest percentage of teams with profitable results; 37% 
in Italy and 45% in France44. 
The other three championships, England, Spain and Germany, went well over 50%. 
Lastly, the trend does not change even at the level of net profit. 
                                                 
43 Report calcio 2016 
44 Report calcio 2017 
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England, Germany and Spain dominate for total net result, average result and number of 
profitable teams. 
According to Report Calcio 2016, the following table shows the situation at 201445 (the 
situation in 2015 is similar). 
 
 Number of 
Top Division 
Club 
Totall net 
result (in mln) 
Average net 
result per club 
(in mln) 
Number of 
profitable 
clubs 
Number of 
not profitable 
clubs 
ENG 20 196.0 9.8 15 5 
GER 18 48.6 2.7 12 6 
ESP 20 176.0 8.8 15 5 
ITA 20 -324.0 -16.2 7 13 
FRA 20 -102.0 -5.1 6 14 
 
 
2.3 STADIUM 
The football transformation from playful moment to real business has effects also with regard 
to stadiums. 
Initially these infrastructures were used only once every 15 days on Sunday afternoon (with the 
exception of structures used by two city teams or those participating in European competitions) 
while nowadays the stadium is considered as a 24/7 usable corporate asset. This happened 
because viewers have become increasingly important for the football system. 
The arrival of radio and TV broadcasts could appear the reason for stadia emptying but it was 
not. At least not everywhere. 
The first stadia were built in the late '800 in England, home of football and its passionate fan. 
In Italy the first stadium was the National Stadium in Rome in 1911 while San Siro in Milano 
was built in 1926. 
Around year 2000, the stadium ownership was predominantly public and clubs used to rent the 
field to play matches since they owned only the training field. With the increase of costs over 
revenue, some clubs gives their training field as guarantee and in the worst scenario they are 
forced to sell their stadiums. 
In these days it is alright for clubs to own their stadiums since it could be a source for new cash 
and financing needed for corporate accounts. 
                                                 
45 Report calcio 2016 
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The problem is that the construction of a stadium requires a lot of funds that clubs often do not 
have and therefore they continue to rent public properties thus demonstrating their preference 
for a short-term vision (typical of the world of football where the results should be immediate) 
rather than a long-term one. This does not happen everywhere.  
2.3.1 THE ITALIAN SITUATION 
As reported by Report Calcio 2017, during the 2015/16 season the overall number of spectators 
attending Italian stadiums for high level matches (from the National Youth Teams to the UEFA 
Champions League) reached almost 14.9 million, in decline compared to the previous seasons 
2014-15 (- 3.2 %). 
In terms of average attendance per match the highest data ere recorded for the UEFA 
Champions League (42,257), followed by Serie A (22,280), the Men’s Italian National A Team 
(21,521 – a reduction of almost 50%), the UEFA Europe League (13,847 – 44% reduction in 
relation to the previous season)46. 
The number of total spectators continues to grow as already highlighted in the prior season. In 
2015/16 the overall number of spectators was 13.6 million, with an increase of 1.8% in respect 
of 2014/15. Despite this positive increase, the situation continues to be critical. The average 
stadium capacity utilization exceeds 50% only in Serie A, falling to 41% in Serie B and 28% 
in Lega Pro. 
The Italian Top Division continues to be highly penalized in comparison to other European 
federations. The overall number of unsold tickets exceeded 8.4 million in 2015/16 in 
comparison with 1.3 million in the German Top Division and 1.1 million in the English one. 
The economic potential is not fully expressed; considering an average stadium capacity 
utilization of 80% (compared to the current 53%) the Italian Top Division clubs would obtain 
additional gate receipts for almost € 94 mln. This figure could reach € 174 mln in case of 100% 
stadium capacity utilization.  
These are amounts of money that could affect and change the football clubs survival. The 
average figure reached per club would be € 8.7 mln, an essential sum for a small-medium size 
club. 
The scenario described above is directly linked with the notorious backwardness of Italian 
football stadiums both at infrastructural profile and at level of services offered. The average age 
of Italian stadiums ranges from 64 years in Serie A to 68 in Serie B and 59 in Lega Pro. The 
percentage of covered seats reaches 77% in Serie A while it is lower than 35% in Serie B and 
Lega Pro. 
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Regarding the construction of newly owned-structure, in Italy there are 4 privately onwned 
stadium. First of all the Juventus Stadium followed by Udinese, Sassuolo and Atalanta 
stadiums. 
In recent years Juventus has been the leading club in such initiatives. The Turin club ranks both 
for sporting and financial performance among the first three or four teams in the world. Thanks 
to the realization of the new stadium, which was inaugurated on September 8, 2011, Juventus 
increased matchdays revenue considerably. 
At a financial level the club acquired the area management for a € 25-million-dollar fee as the 
price for the building area, for 99 years utilisation. 
In addition to this initial spending Juventus had to allocate another € 120 mln, partly funded by 
the sale of the naming right to Sportfive's sports marketing consulting firm, which signed a 12-
year agreement in return for € 75 mln. 
Now let's take a look at the main facilities innovation. 
Juventus’ stadium has revolutionized the way stadiums in Italy are conceived. It is not a mere 
white elephant used only 90 minutes for the games but a combination pole to be used 7 days a 
week. Inside there is a mall (called “area 12” in honor of the fans who are considered the twelfth 
man in the pitch), a museum on Bianconeri’s history, art exhibitions as well as spaces for the 
organization of events with personalities of the world of culture and entertainment. 
From an economic point of view the benefits gained are remarkable. With a capacity of 41,475 
seats (the lowest in Europe) the first year saw an average of 38,000 viewers per game with an 
increase in terms of revenue from € 11.6 mln to € 31.8 mln, a jump of 174%. 
The situation over the last five years is represented by the following graph. 
 
 
 
2011-12 012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16
Matchday revenues 32 38 41 51 44
32
38 41
51
44
Juventus' matchday revenues 2011-2016 (in '000 Euro)
Matchday revenues
52 
 
In terms of revenue the situation would improve even more if Juventus could expand the total 
stadium capacity ((keeping the ticket price at the same level). 
These are incredible data that proved how much economic valuations implemented many 
years ago were well-realized. Juventus Stadium is a project that remains today the model that 
other Italian clubs should follow. 
Currently other teams are considering the option to build a new privately owned stadium.  
Cagliari, Empoli and Fiorentina have already started a project while Milan and Inter have no 
clear ideas on the matter. The complications in the project could cause the Milanese teams to 
stay in San Siro for a long time; renovation and maintenance operations will be made but the 
rest the situation won’t change. 
In Roma’s case, there is a project for a new stadium but it has been blocked. 
2.3.2 EUROPEAN SITUATION AND COMPARISONS 
The table below shows data comparing the top five European leagues. This appears to be 
discouraging for the Italian teams (Report Calcio 2017)47. 
Top division 2015-16   GER      ENG    SPA     ITA        FRA Total 
                                 
Number of club 18  20  20  20  20  98 
Number of matches 307  380  380  380  380  1.827 
Championship average 
turnout 43.327 36.461 28.568 22.280 20.896 29.786 
Championship total turnout 13.301.300 13.855.180 10.855.840 8.466.512 7.940.480 54.419.312 
Championship average 
capacity 47.029 38.155 38.864 39.608 31.208 38.651 
Filling % capacity 92% 96%  74%  56%  67%  77% 
Total potential turnout 14.437.835 14.498.900 14.768.396 15.051.211 11.859.097 70.615.439 
Unsold seats 1.136.535 643.720 3.912.556 6.584.699 3.918.617 16.196.127 
                          
Number of national cup games 15  56  45  34  36  186 
National Cup average turnout 47.305 34.191 22.178 12.857 14.294 24.592 
National Cup total turnout 709.569 1.914.701 998.011 437.138 514.601 4.574.020 
Filling % capacity 88% 83%  52% 29%  46%  60% 
Total potential turnout 802.288 2.303.205 1.906.305 1.510.438 1.113.455 7.635.691 
Unsold seats 92.719 388.504 908.294 1.073.300 598.854 3.061.671 
                          
Number of European cup 
games 36  37  45  23  28  169 
European cup average turnout 44.543 46.987 43.617 24.964 25.217 38.965 
European Cup total turnout 1.603.554 1.738.536 1.962.751 574.181 706.088 6.585.110 
Filling % capacity 93% 94%  76%  43%  59%  76% 
Total potential turnout 1.724.553 1.856.434 2.589.092 1.322.484 1.194.968 8.687.531 
Unsold seats 120.999 117.898 626.341 748.303 488.880 2.102.421 
                               
NUMBER OF TOTAL 
GAMES 358   473   470   437  444  2.182 
                                                 
47 Report calcio 2017 
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TOTAL EFFECTIVE 
TURNOUT 15.614.423 17.508.417 13.816.602 9.477.831 9.161.169 65.578.442 
       
AVERAGE TURNOUT 43.616 37.016 29.397 21.688 20.633 30.054 
            
FILLING % CAPACITY 92% 94%   72%  53% 65%  75% 
       
TOTAL POTENTIAL 
TURNOUT 16.964.676 18.658.539 19.263.793 17.884.133 14.167.520 86.938.661 
       
TOTAL UNSOLD SEATS 1.350.253 1.150.122 5.447.191 8.406.302 5.006.351 21.360.219 
                                 
 
In season 2015/16, Italy ranks fourth in terms of average turnout at championship matches and 
it is the last in relation to stadium attendance (only 56%). 
In terms of average attendance Italy is in the last position for both European cups and the 
national cup (Coppa Italia). 
In terms of total turnout England, Germany and Spain are clearly outgrowing Italy and France 
whose numbers are however steadily increasing. The English championship exceeds 17.5 mln 
people and ranks first followed by Germany (15.6 mln) and Spain (13.8 mln). 
England ranks first also in relation to the attendance percentage. On average, in every single 
match, an English stadium has 96% attendance of the total capacity. Germany follows with 
92% and Spain with 78%. 
The two most successful models are certainly England and Germany ones. 
English football has always been characterized by full-attendance stadium and a captivating 
atmosphere. Going to the stadium represents for fans the "most beautiful moment of the week" 
when you share with others your passion for football. 
The fundamental aspect of economic and sport culture that distinguishes British football from 
the rest of the world is the ownership of the stadium. 
Before everybody else, the English teams realized the importance of investing in the club's 
infrastructures, studying facilities and equip them with every kind of comfort. Also real 
commercial citadels and little villages near the stadium were created. 
The basic concept behind the phenomenon of the stadium is to try to attract fans and tourists of 
all kinds. 
The stadium is therefore the center of survival of the English clubs, it has a full exploitation at 
360 degrees in sporting, commercial and economic sense. 
In the Italian stadium traditional view fans come to the stadium just before the start of the game 
and leave the facility immediately after. In the British idea fans come to the stadium early in 
the morning, eat their meal in the indoor lounges or in pubs outside and find leisure activities 
awaiting for the start of the match. The same happens at the end of the game.  Fan can stop in 
the stores, buy their own team T-shirts, scarves and gadgets. 
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Clubs that own a stadium can count on the highest turnover. In this special ranking the Premier 
leads, as in 2016/17 season 16 stadiums on a total of 20 teams were privately owned. The 
Bundes (the only league with 18 teams) with 10 follows. The municipal owned stadium is 
instead typical of Spain (where 13 stadiums are not owned by clubs), Italy (only 4 teams own 
their own facility) and France where only Paris Saint Germain is tenant and owner of his playing 
field. 
Three factors question Premier League’s primacy in favor of the German model which are age, 
naming rights and capacity. 
The data concerning the age of the stadiums take into consideration only those built or 
restructured from 2000 onwards. Bundesliga has the lead as in the next season 2016/17 can 
count on eleven constructed or renewed installations over the past sixteen years. German 
success is also due to investments made in the 2006 World Cup that had a fundamental role. It 
is not even bad for the Premier that in the same year has cut the tape at seven facilities. In the 
coming seasons with the opening of the new Anfield Road, Stamford Bridge and White Hart 
Lane, the numbers will increase. 
Another statistic that has allowed Bundesliga to prevail over the Premier is naming rights. In 
Germany there are 14 clubs whose facilities are being sponsored (Bayern Munich with Allianz 
to the last one Leipzig with Red Bull for € 70 mln). In Premier the numbers are exactly half. 
The third and final aspect concerns the capacity of the facilities. Once again the Bundesliga is 
leading the ranking with 44,563 seats. The German stadiums are the largest in Europe. 
However, Premier is out of the podium and ranks fourth with 37,445 seats. Serie A, which can 
count on an average availability of 40,356 seats, ranks seconds. Closing the podium is Liga 
with 38,377 and further down the list Ligue 1 with 32,650 seats. 
What is clearly evident from this comparison is that only Bundes keeps up with Premier 
League in term of facilities and related benefits. 
 
Let’s take a look at the importance of stadiums in term of revenue.  
As reported by Calcio e Finanza, the chart below shows the best results per club in term of 
matchdays revenue in 2015/16 season. 
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Arsenal ranks first. 
Arsenal and the Emirates Stadium in London  is the model that many clubs have looked at (and 
continues to look at) in recent years. It is a state-of-the-art facility which, since its inauguration, 
has become an important source of revenue for the club. 
The construction started in 2004 costed € 560 million. About a third of the sum was funded 
through the expiration of long-term bank financing (expiring of 2031). The remaining amount 
was funded with the proceeds of real estate transactions carried out on the place where the old 
Highbury stadium was and where a residential complex of 680 flats was built and by 
renegotiating the naming rights of the new facility to the Emirates airline at a price of around € 
120 mln for 15 years.  
Matchdays revenue rised from € 63.8 million of last season in Old Highbury to € 134.6 million 
in the new first season new facility. This is because the increase in the available seats allowed 
Arsenal to have about 44,000 subscribers per year and an average of around 60,000 viewers per 
game, with an attendance percentage close to 100%. 
Looking at the last five years’ data, matchday revenue never fell below € 100 mln. Hence the 
investment made by Arsenal in 2006 was fully recovered from the revenue generated by the 
stadium. 
The podium is completed by the two Spanish giants Barcelona and Real Madrid not mentioned 
so far. Gate receipts revenues represent 20% on total sales and therefore they are an absolutely 
reliable source of income. 
It is not a coincidence that in the top ten, five are English teams, all of which have a privately 
owned stadium. The already mentioned Arsenal is followed by Manchester United, Chelsea, 
Liverpool and Manchester City. 
Lastly, despite the growth in recent years, Juventus is lagging behind in term of matchday 
revenue, generating at least 50% less than all teams except Manchester City. 
games 
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Stadium revenue depend on both the average turnout (already mentioned) and the ticket price. 
Analyzing the data for the latter, Report Calcio 2017 shows that Premier League charges the 
highest average price which is € 52.20 per game. 
This price, fans passion and total and average attendance, explain the results in terms of gate 
receipts and matchday revenue achieved by British clubs.  
Spain and Germany complete the trio, respectively with € 41.2 and € 35.5 per match. 
Again in this case, this average price together with a high and constant average turnout allows 
German and Spanish clubs, as well as British ones, to benefit by this income component to 
increase their total revenue. 
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CHAPTER 3 - ACCOUNTING INFORMATION 
The football sector is a complex environment in which in many cases economy, finance and 
even laws are distorted, sometimes bent, in some cases ignored. 
The economic reality within which football clubs are managed is extremely complicated.  
The Italian football landscape has seen some very controversial cases of creative accounting 
and "administrative doping". Our country has been the scene of economic affairs like 
bankruptcy failures or bailouts in extremis relating to several soccer companies, even among 
the most prestigious. 
The reasons that led football clubs on the road to disaster are to be searched in the evolution of 
football world over the years. Born as a simple sport associations many realities are transformed 
into complex social groups to better manage and exploit every aspect (from sports to advertising 
to the economic aspetc) related to football activity. 
This evolution has not been supported by regulatory institutions and by adequate control bodies. 
Soon the system started collapsing due to inadequate management models and deleterious 
organizational structures in the medium and long run. 
The first part of this chapter analyses how players’ registratios are accounted according to both 
national and international accounting standards and how and where they are allocated into the 
balance sheet. 
The second part shows creative accounting peculiarities and issues in relation to fictitious 
capital gain and exchange, depreciation transactions, loan operations with right or binding 
option to sign and sale of the brand. 
 
3.1. DISPOSAL ON PLAYERS’ REGISTRATION RIGHTS - NATURE AND 
ECONOMIC MEANING  
The study of football clubs financial statements and the accounting treatment of the related 
items is mainly based on players’ registration rights.  
The economic relevance of these investments and the resulting costs, such as wages (primarily) 
and amortization, led the control bodies (Covisoc48, for the Italian context) to monitor this line 
item by setting up specific indicators aimed at ensuring the financial equilibrium in the 
management. 
In the Italian tradition this item is located in the balance sheet as an asset.  
                                                 
48 Commissione di Vigilanza sulle Società di Calcio Professionistiche: it is a technical body that carries out tasks on behalf of 
the FIGC such as consultative activities (Article 79 NOIF), control activities on football clubs economic and financial 
equilibrium (Article 80 NOIF), inspections and controls (Article 87 of the NOIF).  
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This treatment is particularly evident in the multi-year nature of the investment that has led our 
doctrine to assimilate it as an intangible asset in all its effects. 
At international standards level, there is no uniformity regarding the nature or the accounting 
treatment of this item. 
Divergences concern some ways of detecting and capitalizing on such costs. 
The advent of IAS / IFRS, mandatory since 2006 for listed companies, also drew attention to 
the significance of this accounting entry within these principles. 
In order to understand the nature of players' registration rights in the financial statements, in 
accordance with the international accounting standards, it is necessary to understand the 
meaning that the IASB49 attributes to the concept of intangible asset. 
The benchmark is IAS 38, named Intangible Assets. 
According to IAS 3850 intangible assets are non-monetary assets without physical substance and 
they must be identifiable. An intangible asset to be identifiable has to be separable and arise 
from contractual or other legal rights. However, it should only be recognized if it expects to 
generate future economic benefits and if the cost of the asset can be measured reliably. 
The resource deriving from the purchase of a football player can not be considered as a tangible 
asset since the object of the sale is not the physical entity of a footballer but the right to use its 
sports performance. 
At the same time football companies do not exercise any control over the person but only have 
a legally protected exclusivity on their performance over a period of time, normally over one 
year. 
In the case of players' registration it appears evident that the prevailing aspect should be 
considered as immaterial. 
Despite the presence of a contract the company does not have any claim of control or law on 
the human being. 
Therefore, the players' registration is certainly a non-monetary assets, without physical 
consistency, as required by IAS 38. 
In order to demonstrate that this is all about an intangible resource it is imperative to check 
whether this item also responds to the other requirements as resource control, ability to produce 
future economic benefits and autonomous identifiability. 
Regarding resource control, players' registration seems to meet this requirement. When a club 
acquires a footballer and signs a multi-year contract, it gets the option to benefit from the future 
                                                 
49 International Accounting Standard Board 
50 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/docs/consolidated/ias38_en.pdf  
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economic benefits associated with the use of sporting services limiting that benefit to third 
parties. 
However, this is more controlled than other business assets. In the case of players transfer 
consent is required. This is at the same time full control over the resource for the time period 
stipulated by the contract and a limited control constrained by the consensus of the athlete. 
Regarding future economic benefits players under contract with a club, home-grown or acquired 
are expected to generate future economic benefits for the club as they are bound to it for a 
certain period of time and due to the fact that clubs, in gerenal, exist as holder of players’ 
registration rights without which the possibility to carry on a football activity would be 
precluded. Basically, future economic benefit can be revenue or cost savings. In order to assess 
the future economic benefit, a club shall use reasonable and supportable assumptions 
representing management’s best estimates of the economic conditions during the useful life of 
the asset on the basis of evidence available at the time of the initial recognition (IASB). 
The last feature is related to identifiability. No doubts that players’ registration identification is 
an intangible assets. Based on their nature, players are constantly subject to buying and selling 
or loan operations among clubs.  
As a conclusion, players’ registration rights have all the requirements required by IAS/IFRS to 
be considered as intangible assets. They represent monetary resources, without physical 
substance, easily identifiable from other entities. 
Further, the club owns a kind of control over these rights that turn out to be acquired in the past 
from which economic future benefits will be obtained.  
 
Now we will focus on players’ registration rights allocation in the balance sheet and, in 
particular, in the balance sheet ruled by art. 2424 of the Italian Civil Code. 
Both at national and international level the prevailing doctrine agrees to attribute to this line 
item the nature of intangible assets ascribable to financial assets. 
The only case in which it would not be possible to capitalize the cost of purchase is related to 
the drafting of an annual contract. In this case the cost incurred would be entirely charged to 
the income statement within item B7 "service costs" (that seems to be the most consistent item). 
In the presence of a multi-year contract the purchase cost definitely has all the characteristics 
to be included in the non-current asset. These are for all intents and purposes sporting 
performance available for several years on the basis of a contract and therefore durable and 
with multi-year utility. 
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The most important issue is the identification of the balance sheet line item more appropriate 
with the player's registration rights nature. 
Accounting recommendation No. 151, dedicated to players' registration rights, considers that the 
nature of this item can be assimilated to concession rights and similar, classified under item 
B.I.4) concessions, licenses, trademarks and similar rights. 
This line item is about the right to exclusive exploitation of a given asset for a given period of 
time. There are no particular criticisms or divergences on this topic with literature and doctrine. 
As it can not be traced back to any of the other intangible assets, the assimilation of players' 
registration under item B.I.4 is undoubtedly the most appropriate one. 
Even if acknowledging the nature of this item, which is similar to concessions, the accounting 
recommendations tend to provide a separate indication in the financial statements, according to 
Art. 2423-ter Civil Code, which governs the possibility of adding other items if their contents 
are not included in the civilian scheme terms or if the particular nature of the activity requires 
a new line item. 
The reporting framworks and the Federal Accounting Plan also require the disclosure of a 
separate allocation, under the voice named B.I.8) players' registration rights. 
Player's registration represents an exclusive line item linked to the specificity of the business 
carried out by the football company which can not be sold or allocated in the budget of any 
other type of company, unrelated to the sport sector. 
Hence, according to the national accounting principles this item is accounted as an intangible 
asset. It gives the club the exclusive right to use the player’s performance for the entire duration 
of the contract. 
 
3.2. CREATIVE ACCOUNTING 
"Creative Accounting" is a phenomenon of great relevance and interest. Despite the fact that 
following major accounting scandals the countries involved have made important efforts and 
controls to prevent and avoid such phenomena, cases of accounting misleading have not been 
completely eliminated. 
To get more into the substance of the theme, it is essential to make it unambiguously definable. 
This is quite simple from the theoretical point of view but it is not from a practical one. In fact, 
the term Creative Accounting refers to the use of flexibility in accounting, remaining within the 
current regulatory framework, with the aim of manipulating the presentation and the valuation 
                                                 
51 http://users.unimi.it/d_sport/allegati/dispense1213/20130207/mancini/Raccomandazioni_contabili_F.I.G.C._2008_2.pdf  
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of accounts in order to give priority to the interests of editors rather than those financial 
statements final users. 
Creative accounting generates accounting numbers intended to deceive shareholders and other 
users. It damages the credibility of the company and its managers and it can financially damage 
shareholders and other users who rely on them for their decision. Creative accounting 
effectively destroys the trust on which the principal-agent relationships needs to be based and 
can de-stabilize capital markets.  
In a perfect world, where managers should be perfectly able to reach expectations and business 
goals at any time, there would be no incentives or reasons to adopt Creative Accounting 
practices. In the reality of the facts, however, various purposes drive managers to manipulate 
budget accounts. 
The reasons that lead an organization to use creative accounting can be internal and external. 
The first case relates to the manipulation of accounting books in order to achieve goals set in 
terms of sales, profitability and price of the shares; the second case concerns the expectations 
of those who have relationships with the company and therefore shareholders in the first place, 
followed by employees, customers, suppliers and investors. 
Another important incentive for adopting creative accounting is the need to maintain a stable 
income profile in order to impress investors and prevent sudden stock price fluctuations. 
Finally, at a purely accounting level, creative accounting is used to reduce the tax burden and 
the pre-tax income on which the annual tax is calculated. 
In relation to football clubs, creative accounting cases are very frequent and easy to implement 
as there is no benchmarking market for players. Most often players price is decided subjectively 
by club executives based on technical parameters (age, games played, injuries, growth margins) 
and market (price trends). 
The most important creative accounting practices are dummy capital gains through player 
exchange, brand selling, amortization and load with right or binding option to sign. 
The goal is to change the actual composition of costs and revenue, achieving operational income 
and outcomes appropriate to the club's situation. 
3.2.1. FICTITIOUS CAPITAL GAIN AND EXCHANGE 
Capital gain is defined as the higher value of an asset (a football player) with respect to its 
carrying amount. 
A club usually buys a player from an other company paying a certain amount of money; also it 
may happen that two clubs decide to exchange two players thus eliminating any kind of money 
movement (or with a limited cash payment). 
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This is the case where fictitious gains may occur. 
Capital gains in football have always existed. It is only in recent times that they have become 
the only survival way for such a business sector during a crisis situation.  
It is well known that the increase in revenue is accompanied by a corresponding increase in the 
ratings of football players and by an unstoppable increase in employees costs. In recent years 
the financial statements of many clubs have recorded labor cost values that are even higher than 
sales. Accounts balances in the red have a single consequence - their replenishment, that is, a 
fresh cash payment that balances the financial situation. 
Obviously, not all football club owners are able to shell out millions of Euros annually to cover 
the losses. 
Today's budgets show substantial losses, and none of them, even the richest, decides lightly to 
replenish the losses. 
Then, how to set up budgets to be in line with the parameters required to sign up for the 
championship or with FFP parameters? Simply adopting the capital gains system. 
Logic requires that if you want to get a profitable income, you need to surrender an important 
player with a high market share. But it is equally obvious that if you lose a precious piece in 
your team, you have to replace it with an element of equivalent value unless you resign yourself 
to lose competitiveness. A vicious circle, then.  
Until the early 1990s football worked just like this. Who had the money (the big ones) invested 
in football players, who did not have money (the small ones) got by trying to resell young talents 
grown in the house. But everything has changed by adding the adjective "fictitious" to the 
capital gain word. Why "dummy"? An example may come in handy (Economia delle aziende 
sportive – 2009): 
 
Example 1. The soccer company A sells to company B the player’s registration right of its 
player X, historical cost 1,000, depreciation provision 600, carrying value 400, agreed selling 
price 700 with a net capital gain of 300 (700-400). Company B will in turn transfer to company 
A the player’s registration right of its player Y, historical cost 900, depreciation provision 600, 
carrying value 300, agreed sale price 500 with a net capital gain of 200 (500- 300). In view of 
the different market prices attributed to the two players, company B will have to pay to A an 
amount 200, i.e. the difference between the market value of X, equal to 700 and Y equal to 500. 
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X and Y new contracts last for five years. The financial adjustment is regulated through the 
clearing house52 of the Italian football League Serie A. The accounting records of the two 
companies are reported below: 
 CLUB A 
          
          
  Player’s registration right    Depreciation Provision  
 (2)  500  1000 (1)    (1)       600     
              
          
  Seria A’s account    Capial gain  
(1)   700    500 (2)     300  (1) 
               
          
CLUB B       
      
      
          
          
  Player’s registration right    Depreciation Provision  
(1)  700 900 (2)    (2)       600     
              
          
  Seria A’s account    Capial gain  
(1)  500 700 (2)    200 (2) 
               
 
(1) transfer market of player X from A to B 
(2) transfer market of player Y from B to A 
 
Following the exchange the two clubs record on debit in the player's registration right account 
the disbursement of the historical cost of the player that will be transferred and the value of the 
agreed purchase cost on credit. Both companies recognize gains of 300 and 200 respectively to 
report in the income statement. 
From the exchange club A has a credit to the league Serie A to be settled through the clearing 
house of 200 while company B has a debt to the league Serie A for the same amount. 
 
                                                 
52 Exchanges made between professional clubs are regulated through a complex system centrally managed by the Italian 
football League (Serie A), which acts as a clearing room for established creditors and debtors relation. The league, by means 
of special accounts, record all exchanges for the various professional companies during the reference period. Then itt will be 
up to the league itself to collect debts from companies that have a lump sum and paying advances, over the total due, to credit 
clubs. 
http://www.figc.it/Assets/contentresources_2/ContenutoGenerico/52.$plit/C_2_ContenutoGenerico_2532976_StrilloComuni
catoUfficiale_lstAllegati_0_upfAllegato.pdf  
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Based on the previous example we now make some changes to the sale price only. Player X is 
sold at 1,700 instead of 700, player Y is sold at 1,500 instead of 500, all the other things being 
equal. 
Again, both clubs succeed in gaining from the exchange. A's gains moves from 300 to 1300 
and B from 200 to 1200. A's credit and B's debit to the league remain unchanged. 
 
CLUB A:  
  
          
  Player’s registration right    Depreciation Provision  
(2)  1,500   1,000 (1)    (1)       600     
              
          
  Seria A’s account    Capial gain  
(1)   1,700    1,500 (2)     1,300  (1) 
               
          
CLUB B       
      
      
          
          
  Player’s registration right    Depreciation Provision  
(1)  1,700   900 (2)    (2)       600     
              
          
  Seria A’s account    Capial gain  
(1)   1,500    1,700 (2)     1,200  (2) 
               
          
(1) transfer market of player X from A to B 
(2) transfer market of player Y from B to A 
 
It is clear that the increase of 1,000 in the transfer price between the two clubs produces the 
following results: 
- Both clubs record a higher gain of 1000 in the income statement, with consequent 
benefits on the net profit for the period; 
- Player's registration right value is greater than the first case, exactly 1,000. This will 
result in higher amortization in the income statement for the cuurent year and for the 
subsequent ones (based on the duration of the contract). However, if the greater 
gains have a positive impact of 1,000 on the economic result, the amortization is 
negatively reflected only for 1/5 of their value, or 200, being this subdivision based 
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on the entire duration of the contract (5 years). In the short run, therefore, the club 
has an economic advantage of 4/5 of the higher declared value over the real one; 
- The net financial position of the two clubs does not change in relation to the previous 
example, with a A’s credit of 200 and a B’s debt of 200. 
 
The examples provided here illustrate the purposes underlying some exchange transactions and 
the resulting effect generated by these financial statements policies. 
Once the amount to be paid by a club is decided, to get the wanted benefits the clubs just need 
to increase the amount of their players’ declared value. In this way it is possible for both 
companies to achieve an economic advantage during the year in which the transaction is 
accounted for through greater income gains recorded in the income statement. 
This "collusive" attitude does not match with other business areas; the fictitious higher income 
would increase the taxable base for the purpose of calculating taxes, resulting in an increase in 
the tax burden for the enterprise. The diffusion of this procedure has been adopted due to 
historical high losses which constantly affect football clubs balance sheet. This has made 
convenient to adopt this expedient because it has allowed to improve the economic result and 
balance sheet of both parties involved in the operation. 
The use of players' registration right exchanges allowed some clubs to avoid large 
recapitalizations in compliance with law and regulation. Often these athletes prior to the sale 
were usually included in the balance sheet at very low or even nil values thus enabling the 
realization of very high fictitious gains. However, this practice is not a definitive solution to 
solve financial issues but it is only a postponement of costs to the subsequent exercises. The 
increase in the players' registration is reflected in a dilation of future amortization which, in the 
absence of proportional growth revenue, can generate higher income statement losses the higher 
the players' registration overestimation in previous years has been. 
As a rule exchanges related to creative accounting policies that hide unjust capital gains are 
made with "peer" exchanges that do not involve cash outlay or at least amounts that are 
irrelevant with respect to the declared value of the players. 
3.2.2 DEPRECIATION PROCESS 
Players’ registration rights balance sheet value must be subsequently amortized in compliance 
with the nature of intangible assets and in accordance with art. 2426 n. 2 c.c53. 
The accounting principle n. 24 in turn states that amortization constitutes a "systematic" process 
of cost allocation sustained based on the entire assets useful life. 
                                                 
53 http://www.universocoop.it/codice/art_2426.html  
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Systematic does not necessarily imply the use of constant rates plans although this is the most 
commonly used methodology. 
According to the same accounting principles, "systematicity" translates into the predisposition 
of an amortization plan. To this end the preparation of the depreciation plan requires the 
knowledge of the following elements: 
1. Depreciable value 
2. Remaining useful life 
3. Allocation criteria of the depreciable value 
 
With regard to the first element, the depreciable value estimation as an intangible assets since 
1999 (approval year of accounting principle n. 24) was based on similar provisions as for 
tangible assets. 
The depreciable value is therefore determined as "the difference between the cost of the asset 
and its expected residual value at the end of its useful life. 
According to this provision, therefore, the purchase cost is not the value to be subject to 
amortization. To calculate this amount the residual value of the asset must be deducted from 
the purchase price. 
The accounting principles, however, point out that the residual value is often so small with 
respect to the value to be amortized that it is not taken into account in the computation. 
The application of this provision to players' registration rights leads to a systematic conclusion 
about the residual value in the depreciable value computation. The same principles do not 
consider it necessary to take that amount into account in determining the depreciable value. 
Whether the residual value takes on a significant amount, it is mandatory to estimate this 
amount for the purposes of valuation. This expectation is significant as in the football sector 
players' rights transfer price is often higher than the same purchase value. 
The same accounting principles require to systematically update the assets residual value on the 
basis of feasible prices on the market through a possible sale. This presupposes that even in the 
case of players' registration it is likely that a proceed from the sale of the asset will be obtained 
and or it is possible to determine the reliable amount within the market. 
Even if such assumptions appear to favor the recognition of the residual value as an adjustment 
of the purchase cost, other factors exclude such hypothesis. These variables are as follows. The 
ability to find an agreement with a new buyer. The player's willingness to accept the transfer 
(this requirement is exclusive only for players' registration rights). The remaining years of the 
contract and in particular the case of one year left contract; beyond this deadline, the effects of 
the redemption occur and the club can not claim any remuneration from a possible sale. Last 
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but not least and not less important, each player has technical characteristics that make him 
unique in a market where official quotations do not exist. Their value depends on variables such 
as physical-technical abilities, state of form, performance and notoriety, etc. 
Based on the considerations just mentioned, the estimated realizable value can not be deducted 
from the purchase cost. 
The uncertainty about the realization of this positive component in the future would result in an 
infringement of the prudence principle. 
 
The remaining useful life is related not to the physical lifetime of the assets, but to their 
economic lifetime defined as the period in which the asset is expected to be useful to the club. 
The contract through which a club acquires players' registration rights may not exceed 5 years, 
in accordance with art. 5 of Law 91/8154.  
The legal duration is equal to the one set in the contract. Generally this coincides with the useful 
life of the same players' rights in the balance sheet. Even in the case of players' registration 
rights, if the economic duration was lower than the legal one, the latter could not be taken as a 
reference period in which the purchase price for the determination of the depreciable value is 
spread. 
However, more often the opportunity to review the remaining useful life of players' registration 
rights arises during their period of use especially as a result of injuries that may be partially or 
definitively compromising. 
The accounting recommendation n. 1 appears more "rigid" than the one just shown and in 
particular: amortization must be determined on account of the entire duration of the contract 
that binds the player to the club and for a time not exceeding five years (maximum legal duration 
of the contract). This is a provision that does not allow revisions in the calculation of useful life 
in the case of economic lifetime lower than legal term. 
Accounting recommendation n. 1, in line with what established by the national accounting 
standards, provides a specific amortization plan for each player based on the cost and useful 
life and therefore the duration of the contract. 
The amortization effective date is the one in which the player starts to pursue his or her sport 
activity, that is during the season in which the sign-up took place. In the event of an acquisition 
during the financial year the amortization begins from the date of player availability using the 
pro rata temporis method in compliance with the principle of economic competence. 
                                                 
54 
http://www.figc.it/Assets/contentresources_2/ContenutoGenerico/87.$plit/C_2_ContenutoGenerico_3814_lstSezioni_numSe
zione0_lstCapitoli_numCapitolo1_upfFileUpload_it.pdf  
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All values of capitalized players must be reviewed individually each year for impairment by 
management. If the amount is lower than what is stated on the balance sheet, it must be adjusted 
to the recoverable amount. 
Accounting principles and prevailing doctrine argue that useful life should be periodically 
reviewed to ascertain that changes to original conditions have occurred.  
Even for players' registration right events designed to change the original life expectancy may 
occur. Such facts may be agonistic activity abandoning on a contract pending, a serious player 
injury, with the risk of failing to achieve full recovery for a return in the field before the 
expiration of the contract and the decision by the cub to sell the player in advance in relation to 
the deadline stipulated in the contract. 
These causes lead to a decrease in the useful lives of players' registration rights. 
 
The last element to be considered refers to the allocating method of the depreciable value. 
The distribution of the cost to be amortized over the residual utilization should ensure a rational 
and systematic accrual during the estimated useful life. 
The preferred and most commonly used method is the one at constant rates obtained by dividing 
the purchase cost for the years of useful life. 
Both national accounting principles and accounting recommendations converge on the 
amortization method at constant rates. 
 
We now come to analyze what gimmicks were and are adopted by the football team managers 
for the purpose of creative accounting with reference to the depreciation line item. 
It is necessary to divide the reference timeline into 3 periods: 
- Until 1981, due to the existence of a tied sport contract55, the acquisition of players' 
rights resulted in an indefinite relationship between player and club; 
- From 1981 to 1995, after the approval of Law 91/81, a maximum limit of 5 years 
was adopted, maintaining some sort of control over the next two years due to the 
ability of claiming the PPI56 payment. 
- Since 1996, after the Bosman’s Law, at the expiration of the contract the club also 
lost the possibility of claiming the PPI payment. Players' rights control is limited to 
only the years of contracts with a maximum of five years. 
                                                 
55 It represents the bond between athlete and club based on which each player, once signed a contract with a football 
company, could not engage with another team unless his membership organisation had given his consent to the transfer. With 
this constraint, the club could use the player's sporting performance for the entire duration of his agility. 
56 Preparation and Promotion Indemnity. This allowance was considered to be a compensation for the loss of human and 
sports potential that a player's transfer could cause to the abandoned club. In essence, the PPI produced the concrete effect of 
reviving the repealed sport constraint. 
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In the first period, in the presence of the sporting constraint, there was no deadline for the 
players' registration rights. Clubs used to establish an unreasonably lengthy amortization period 
often higher than the player's agonistic life. 
By artificially widening the amortization period the club was able to contain the economic 
impact of amortization in the individual financial statements for the entire period of time in 
which players' registration rights were used. 
Subsequent to the approval of Law 91/81, with the abolition of the sports constraint and the 
establishment of PPI extended for two years after the expiration of the contract, clubs resorted 
to the following gimmicks: 
- Two-year extension of the depreciation period with respect to the duration of the 
contract; 
- A reduction in the value of players' rights to be amortized for an amount equal to 
the presumed value of the indemnity at the expiration of the contract in case of player 
transfer. 
With reference to the first policy the two-year extension amortization period allowed for a 
reduction in costs for the year on the basis of the lower amortization value recognized in the 
income statement. 
The second expedient was based on depreciating the player's rights net of the PPI that the club 
could presumably receive after the termination of the contract. The main objective of this 
behaviour is to reduce the impact of amortization in the income statement. 
Obviously, this second aspect has been subject to many criticisms as it refers to a situation when 
the depreciable value can be obtained as the difference between the purchase cost and the 
expected residual value. 
The impairment of PPI as a decrease in the value to be amortized involves a greater reduction 
in future amortization rates and a proportionally higher value of the allowance. 
As already mentioned PPI accounting in reduction of the purchase price is considered a clear 
violation of the prudence principle.  
To conclude, with the repeal of PPI by Law 586/96 (following the Bosman’s Law and the 5 
years maximum limit), creative accounting policies through amortization have diminished. 
Since 1996 the players' registration rights purchase price is amortized at constant rates over the 
whole duration of the contract. 
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3.2.3 LOAN WITH RIGHT OR BINDING OPTION TO SIGN 
Football companies can acquire footballer’s performance right even through a temporary loan 
operation granted by an another club in exchange of a fee payment for the player rental 
(sometimes the fee may be zero). 
The financial difficulties that have hit football clubs over the last few years, making the player 
purchase more expensive from the cost management point of view, involve greater use of the 
players' registration right loan. 
From an accounting perspective, this transaction is entirely similar to the lease / rental of an 
instrumental asset. It therefore requires a leasing club and a tenant (seller and buyer). 
The accounting reflections of this transaction relate mainly to shifting costs and revenue from 
one club to another. 
The club, temporarily purchasing a player's sports performance, supports higher player-related 
costs (wage and salary in the income statement), costs for the temporary purchase of players' 
registration rights (leased assets to third parties in the income statement ) and higher 
amortization in subsequent years in the case of player's sports performance outright purchase 
(depreciation and amortization in the income statement). With reference to the amortization in 
the first year the transferring company keeps owning the player's right and therefore will 
continue to amortize the cost based on the whole duration of the original contract. This solution 
appears in line with the principle of economic competence. 
On the other hand the leasing club will no longer have to charge any of the above mentioned 
costs in the income statement. The economic benefit obtained by the leasing company concerns 
not so much an increase in revenue but a reduction in costs. 
The lessee (buyer) also benefits from the following advantages: 
- Technical availability of a new player at a low cost; 
- Secondly, it may be possible to proceed to the player's outright purchase, 
based on his performance in the new environmental and corporate context. 
On the other hand  the leasing company (seller) has the following advantages: 
- Improvement of the economic situation through the collection of a fee and a 
reduction in administrative and management costs (as mentioned above); 
- More efficient exploitation of the player's fleet in particular those less 
employed or younger footballer. 
The accounting movements are summarized in the table below. 
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 SELLER BUYER 
FIRST YEAR: loan 
operation 
Annual revenue fee for the 
footballer lease granted + 
depreciation 
Annual payment of the lease cost + 
footballer’s wage  
SECOND YEAR 
(onward): case of 
right or binding 
option to sign 
Potential capital gain in the case of 
footballer outright selling + no 
longer depreciation of footballer 
sold 
Footballer’s wages + cost in the 
case of footballer outright 
purchase + depreciation of the new 
footballer acquired 
 
The row FIRST YEAR refers to the accounting operation for the first year only. 
The row SECOND YEAR (onwards) refers to the shiftment of costs and revenue from one club 
to another in the case of right or binding option to sign. In the second case the buyer become 
the new football player owner based on the legal years agreed in the contract.  
On the other hand the seller loses the player’s right ownership, getting instead a potential capital 
gain and a reduction in depreciation and personnel costs. 
Onward means there is the possibility of performing a loan operation based on a two-year loan 
with option or binding obligation to sign, starting from the third year. Lending operations over 
two years are not allowed. 
Creative accounting policies related to loan operations refer to the following stratagems. The 
vendor ascribes in the first year’s income statement the capital gain obtained from the footballer 
future selling, even if the selling may be possible starting from the second year. The debtor 
ascribes in the first year’s income statement the depreciation costs despite the purchase may 
take place only from the following year (and the amortization process as well)57. 
With reference to the binding option to sign, introduced for the first time in the operation of the 
footballer Borriello between Milan and Roma58, this transaction is composed by the right to 
purchase and a private deed59 or a contract that commit the contracting parties to execute the 
redemption. This deed plays an important role. It should impose to ascribe for the first year the 
depreciation cost in the income statement. In contrast, a simple gentlemen's agreement or right 
                                                 
57 http://www.magliarossonera.it/img201011/alb308_2011.pdf  
58 In the original version art. 103 N.O.I.F., the article that regulates this operation does not talk about the obligation to 
purchase. The expression appeared in the market with the transfer of Marco Borriello from Milan to Rome. Giallorossi stated: 
"A.S. Roma S.p.A. has announced it finalised the contract with AC Milan for the free temporary acquisition with obligation 
to purchase of the sporting performance of football player Marco Borriello, with effect from today's date. 
Rome is therefore the club that coined the expression "obligation to purchase", specifying how the statement was carefully 
thought for transparency reasons with respect to the Stock Exchange 
59 It is a written agreement not confirmed by a notary. 
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to purchase would not allow any cost to be included in the income statement in relation to 
amortization of the player's value until the acquisition is exercised. 
The "obligation" is considered to be a masked purchase postponed for a year or two. 
The economic and financial benefits of this operation refer to the possibility of postponing 
payments in an ever-longer future dreaming for big sporting results (like having a car under 
leasing). Since football players selling in Italy can not be paid in instalments over three years, 
this allows clubs to earn one financial year60. The buyer has the opportunity to limit the purchase 
cost and to postpone the claim in the future. The seller obtains an immediate revenue from the 
player's temporary loan, by reducing the cost and may expect future capital gains in the event 
of a potential acquisition by the buyer. 
For both the buyer and the seller, the possibility of lowering losses is achieved reducing the 
share capital utilization to cover losses. 
Ultimately, the binding option is allowed or isn’t it? The Italian League Serie A states: "What 
is not forbidden by our regulation is admitted. If the contract respects the Civil Code, it does 
not violate internal rules andif it is signed by all parties, it is fine for us“. 
Let’s clarify the operations with a numerical example. 
In 2013/14 season club A sells the player X to club B, for a final price of 2,000. According to 
payment rules and with A allowing to B the maximun extention period for the payment (3 
years), the price will be paid in instalments of 600-800-600. 
However, in case of 4 installments, A pretends to lend X to B for the entire 2013/14 season for 
600, fixing an option for a definitive sale at a price of 1,400 (= 2,000 - 600) payable in 3 
installments of 400-600-400 respectively. The following table shows B's monetary outflows in 
the two different hypotheses ("normal" and "tricky"). 
 
SEASON SELLING LOAN DIFFERENCE 
2013/14 600 600 0 
2014/15 800 400 -400 
2015/16 600 600 0 
2016/17  400 -400 
TOTAL 2,000 2,000 -800 
 
 
 
                                                 
60 If two teams wanted to divide the price into 4 rates, going beyond the maximum limit, they could do so by including the 
first installment as a compensation for a fictitious loan that it will be followed by the exercise of the right (actually an 
obligation redemption) of option, with payment of the sale price extended in 3 installments. 
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The final payment does not change.  
With the “fictitious loan” B gets a lower cash outlay for the first three season (1,600 instead of 
2,000) postponing for one year the disbursement of the last instalments. 
A will have the same situation but from reveues point of view. 
From an economic and accounting perspective, the situation is trickier, but without influence 
the personnel cost which is still paid by the team who exploits footballer’s utilisation (team B).  
Let’s suppose team A bought X one season before, in 2012/13, for a price of 2,000 and both A 
and B offered a five-year contract (first year as a trick operation – A in 2012/13 and B in 
2013/14). Based on these conditions B’s costs are as follows. 
 
SEASON PURCHASE61 LOAN DIFFERENCE 
2013/14 400 60062 + 200 
2014/15 400 350 - 50 
2015/16 400 350 - 50 
2016/17 400 350 - 50 
2017/18 400 350 - 50 
TOTAL 2,000 2,000 0 
 
Also in this case totals are the same but costs distribution in the five seasons has changed. In 
the face of a bigger cost in 2013/14, B makes provision for a constant reduction in costs for the 
following four years. 
On the other hand A’s revenue and costs are as below. 
 
SEASON SELLING LOAN DIFFERENCE 
 REVENUE COSTS REVENUE COSTS  
2012/1363  400  400 0 
2013/14 40064  600 40065 -200 
2014/15   200   
TOTAL 400 400 800 800 0 
 
                                                 
61 The value is related to the depreciation of a single year based on a five-year contract (2000/5) 
62 Supposing the same loan price as above 
63 In this period, cost is the same in both case because loan operation takes place starting from the following season 
(2013/14). Thus, no costs and revenue for A in 2012/13 in relation to the loan. The cost of 400 is related to the first-year 
depreciation. 
64 Selling price 2.000. Carrying amount 2.000-400=1.600. Capital gain 2.000-1.600=400. 
65 600 is the loan revenue paid by B; 400 is the depreciation still on behalf of A. 
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In this case the overall economic result (which is equal to 0 in this hypotesis) remains the same 
while the total amount of revenue and costs is different. With the "real" sale A obtains a capital 
gain of 400 in 2013/14 having surrendered X to 2,000 after one year and then with a book value 
of 1,600 net of a one year depreciation of 400. This gain entirely covers the amortization being 
of equal amount. 
With a “fictitious loan”, in 2012/13, A records depreciation only but in 2013/14 it records all 
the 600 of the first installment as a proceed from the loan to which the second depreciation cost 
of 400 must be deducted. In 2015/16, when the sale from A to B is official for a price of 1,400, 
the capital gain is only 200 as the book value is reduced to 1,200 for the two amortization shares 
suffered (2,000-400-400 = 1,200 and 1,400-1,200 = 200 capital gain). 
As anticipated in both cases revenue covers all costs but the "real" sale amounts to 400 while 
the "dummy loans" rise to 800. In addition, for A, the distribution of the overall economic result 
differs in the last two seasons, "spreading" the 400 "revenue surplus" between 2013/14 (200) 
and 2014/15 (200) instead of enrolling them solely in the second-season budget (2013/14 - 400). 
3.2.4 SALE OF THE BRAND  
In the business sector the brand is a distinctive means to recognize and identify a "product-
service" and it is different from the so called competition brand. 
In the case of professional clubs the brand is the founding element of trade relations between 
sports clubs and their markets (sponsors, fans, enthusiasts, stakeholder groups, users). 
In the development of "sports business" the brand, thanks to its reputation, image and loyalty, 
quantifies a relationship with external subjects and determines in economic terms an important 
source of "competitive advantages" for the club of reference. 
For fans and enthusiasts the brand of a sports company identifies the loyalty and discovery of 
their own team. 
The brand, denomination and social colors also represent the "relationship" between the team, 
the fans and the reference territory. 
In company terms the use of a sporting company brand leads to merchandising and marketing 
profitable gains and to customer satisfactory activities. 
As noted for a sports company it is crucial to activate a proper evaluation of its brand. 
The sale of the brand has been "imported" in the Serie A since the mid-2000s. After the golden 
age of super-capital gains and by the need to clean up budgets and financial statements 
especially after the EU's intervention which reduced the space for debts devaluations and 
depreciation according to the “Spalmadebiti law” (Decree Law n. 282, 24 December 2002)66 
                                                 
66 http://gazzette.comune.jesi.an.it/2002/301/2.htm  
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from 10 to 5 years, in 2003 Italian football was financed with this mechanism through 
transactions with a book value over € 600 mln. To the classic sales and resale formula of the 
brand, it is preferable today to create a new company responsible for the exploitation of the 
brand as in the Genoa’s case. 
In practice, in the traditional model, the brand is sold to a football-related company by the 
principal, which immediately collects a certain amount of money so it can adjust the accounts 
and "redeem" at the same time the brand from the related company in order to exploit it 
commercially by paying a periodic fee. The money the affiliated company pays to the football 
club to buy the mark usually comes from a bank loan. The buyer company in turn repays the 
bank each year until the loan pay-off (capital share plus interest which is slightly lower than the 
rent paid by the football club). Ultimately, the round of cash is nothing more than a "masked" 
bank loan that allows the football club in difficulty to cash in immediately an important sum, 
spreading the financial statements in red in multiple exercises through the re-rent of its brand. 
The gain obtained from the brand evaluation and any rents are found only in the single financial 
statements and not in those consolidated (as intragroup transactions). 
The sale and the subsequent lease are two transactions linked to each other, as a result of the 
principle of prevalence of the substance over the form ex art. 2423-bis of the Civil Code, and 
they must be accounted for. The transfer is recognized, but the capital gain is included in the 
income statement as required by the principle of competence and deferred over the term of the 
lease. 
 
Sampdoria (€ 20 mln in capital gain) was the first football club to use this operation in 2003, 
followed in 2005 by Milan (€ 183 mln), Inter (€ 158 mln), Brescia (€ 20 mln), Chievo Verona 
(€ 10 mln), Reggina (€ 10 mln) and Ascoli (€ 5 mln). 
In 2006 Covisoc defines this mechanism as an accounting artifice used as a substitute for 
recapitalization.  
According to detractors, these operations represent nothing more than accounting maquillage. 
Those who defend them argue that these are forms of rationalization of the football company 
activities.  
Covisoc, the industry's governing watchdog, raised some objections at the time but then it 
accepted it as long as the brand's assessment was based on authoritative expertise. The same 
Tax authorities, after careful analysis, excluded forms of circumvention only providing proof 
of economic profitability for brand selling. 
 
In a chronological order US Palermo was the last team to use the brand transfer operation. 
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In June 2016 it sold Mepal Srl, a company it owned, to a subsidiary of a Luxembourg 
Zamparini’s holding company called Alyssa Sa for € 40 mln in a deal that allowed the club to 
close the economic situation with positive profitable results. 
But what did Mepal do to be worth exactly € 40 mln? Before answering this question, we should 
take a ten-year step back. On November 6, 2006, Palermo’s brand was sold to Locat, a Unicredit 
group company, in a lease agreement. 
Palermo sold its brand valued at € 30 million by an expert and at the same time it reacquires it 
with a lease so that it can make commercial use and get appropriate seasonal revenue. Zamparini 
pays Unicredit a € 9 mln installment and the remaining € 21 mln stays in the club cash account. 
Afterwards it pledges to pay back 107 monthly fees of € 242,145 with an interest rate of 5.17% 
and € 300,000 for the final redemption67. 
The transaction therefore generates a gain of € 30 million for Palermo, which is spread out over 
nine years starting from 2007’s consolidated financial statement.  
On June 26, 2014, nine years before termination (Zamparini, “mister capital gains”, is at his 
second sale, although there are no players involved in the transaction) the club lends to the 
subsidiary Mepal Srl originally appointed to build a sports center and stadium "the business 
branch for spreading, developing and enhancing the Palermo’s brand and for producing and 
selling merchandising products." 
In details, Mepal signed a financial lease agreement with Locat (now Unicredit Leasing Spa), 
merchandising plan and license agreements with Flash trading group Srl and Swan Co Srl. At 
the same time it received computers, furniture and facilities for a total value of € 17 mln. The 
amount reinforces at the accounting level the financial assets item of the club consolidated 
financial statements 
At this point, after two turns the wheel', Palermo’s brand has already extracted a value for € 47 
mln. And it is not over. In June 2016 Mepal Srl was sold by Palermo to an unknown 
Luxembourg company called Alyssa Sa for € 40 mln, with a capital gain of € 21.9 million. This 
allowed Palermo to close the financial statement with a profit before taxes of € 395,743. In the 
budget and in the audit report it is stated that Alyssa Sa, a company operating internationally, 
can reach more easily the supporters of the team and has financial means to realize the sports 
center. 
All clear? Evidently not for the judiciary. And Zamparini himself offers evidences that increase 
confusion. In an interview to “Giornale di Sicilia” on July 8 2017, he explains that "Mepal is 
the reason why everything started." For the Palermo president, "this is absolutely nothing. With 
                                                 
67 http://www.goal.com/it/notizie/goal-economy-palermo-zamparini-e-la-cessione-del-
marchio/1j3ddrouuvejg19yvmp1vkk06o 
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Mepal we did an optimization balance and is now returning as a reverse transaction. Instead 
of being enrolled as a credit, it will become a participation. If someone wants to have fun in 
watching a crime, it may have a good time68. " 
We will see how the judiciary will express itself on the assumptions of the offense raised.  
The fact remains that in ten years the passage from Locat to Mepal and then to Alyssa  the 
Palermo’s brand generated three-step accounting gains for € 68.9 mln. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68 http://palermo.gds.it/2017/07/08/palermo-finanza-per-16-ore-allo-stadio-tutte-le-accuse-per-zamparini-il-patron-nessun-
passaggio-illecito_693226/  
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CHAPTER 4 - FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE  
The relationship between sport and economic results is often crucial to the success of a club's 
management policy. 
Football companies as well as all businesses need funds to cover and finance their expenses. 
These funds can come from sources such as gate receipts, television rights, merchandising, 
sponsors and capital gains recorded for the sale of the players. If the turnover is not high enough, 
the clubs will have to resort to indebtedness. In this sense it can be stated that the greater the 
club's wealth the greater its ability to spend money and therefore the probability to achieve 
better results on the pitch. 
Therefore, there is a growing correlation between sports performance and financial resources. 
The concentration of huge economic resources is inevitably reflected on the playing field and 
therefore in the championship standings. 
This can be demostrated by the 30 years of the Berlusconi’s presidency at Milan's leadership. 
The first 25 years were characterized by huge and continuous investments that have led to 
incessant victories and trophies making Milan the most titled club in the world. In the last 5 
years there has been a real "closure of taps". The best players have been sold to settle accounts 
and losses. Mediocre players were often purchased by following the policy of buying at the 
expiration of the contract. Wage reduction policies have been implemented in order to contain 
costs. All of these factors are the result of lack of participation in European competitions, lower 
wins in the pitch and zero trophies. 
Hence, it is possible to say that revenues of a football company increase proportionally to the 
percentage of winnings. 
As we will see in the next paragraph only in the last market transfer window, due to the change 
of the ownership, Milan has returned to invest heavily in the market realizing a real renovation 
with the goal of returning in the European competition both in the short and long run. 
This chapter concerns the following issues. The financial performance of Milan with particular 
reference to the impact of the 2017 transfer market on the budget, how all costs incurred will 
be charged in the 2017/18 financial statement and in which way the available financial resources 
were obtained. The 2017’s transfer market impact on the budget will also be analyzed for 
Juventus. Furthermore, this chapter presents the result of an indexes evaluation between Milan’s 
and Juventus’ financial performance and the last years’ revenue growth trend of Europe’s top 
clubs.  
With this backgroud the soccer sector can be considered a business characterized by continuous 
vicious circles. Good sports performance implies higher turnover and funds that can be invested 
to improve the sports results. 
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4.1 MILAN’S FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE  
After five years of cost containment Milan returned to invest in the 2017 summer transfer 
market window for a total spending of around € 240 mln. 
The new Chinese ownership led by the CEO Marco Fassone and the SD69 Massimiliamo 
Mirabelli made a real renovation of the team buying 11 new players. 
Now we will analyze the financial aspects of this new management in terms of expenditure 
incurred and impact on the budget. All figures reported are not official yet but derived from 
reliable news media (Milan is not listed on the stock exchange and therefore it has no obligation 
to make public the financial transactions). 
We will estimate the results based on data available to understand what was the transfer 
campaign impact on  Milan’s balance sheet at the end of the 2017’s football market. 
 
Gross wages of new players + 55.6 
Gross wages of players sold/released -39.83 
G. Donnarumma’s gross wage variation + 10.8 
Montella’s gross wage variation + 1.5 
New players depreciation + 41.4 
Depreciation saving from players sold -4 
Capital gain/loss -17.38 
Loan expenses +9 
Loan revenue -7.5 
Expired loans saving -1.9 
HIGHER COSTS IN THE INCOME STATEMENT + 47.69 
 
According to estimates by Calcio and Finanza, the higher costs to be charged in the 2017/18 
income statement would be € 58.83 mln net of capital gains and savings in sales costs. 
The detailed player-to-player table relative to the cost impact of the summer market window in 
the balance sheet is represented below (in the table the largest cost related to Montella’s contract 
renewal is not included but it has been considered in the overall calculation above)70. 
 
Player 
Purchase 
Cost 
Years of 
contract 
Depreciation 
Loan 
cost 
Net 
wage 
Gross 
wage 
FS 
impact 
Musacchio 18.0 4 4.5  2.5 4.6 9.1 
Kessie * - 4 - 4.0 2.5 4.6 8.6 
Rodriguez 18.0 4 4.5  2.5 4.6 9.1 
                                                 
69 Sport Director 
70 http://www.calcioefinanza.it/2017/07/14/calciomercato-milan-e-impatti-sul-bilancio-saldo-gli-arrivi-bonucci-biglia/  
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Silva 38.0 5 7.6  2.0 3.7 11.3 
Calhanoglu 22.0 4 5.5  3.0 5.6 11.1 
Borini ** - 1 -  1.5 2.8 2.8 
Conti 24.0 5 4.8  2.0 3.7 8.5 
Biglia *** 17.0 3 5.7  3.5 6.5 12.1 
A.Donnarumma 1.5 4 0.4  1 1.9 2.2 
Bonucci 42.0 5 8.4  6.5 12.0 20.4 
G.Donnarumma*
*** 
0 4 -  6.0 10.8 10.8 
Kalinic ***** - 4 - 5.0 3.0 5.6 10.6 
TOTAL 180.5  41.4 9.0  66.4 116.8 
* two-year loan (€ 4 mln per year) + € 20 mln obligation to purchase 
** one year loan (for free) + € 6 mln obligation to purchase 
*** the final purchase cost might be € 3 mln higher because of a variable part based on some bonus 
**** contract renewal 
***** one year loan (€ 5 mln) + € 20 mln obligation to purchase 
 
The player-to-player details relative to outgoing market window and the FS positive impact are 
as follow71. 
Player Operation 
Selling 
Price 
Capital 
gain/loss 
Deprec. 
saved 
Saving 
for 
ended 
loan 
Loan 
revenue 
Net 
wage 
Gross 
wage 
FS 
impact 
Deulofeu Loan ended    0.75  0.7 1.3 2.05 
Pasalic Loan ended    0.20  0.8 1.48 1.68 
Ocampos Loan ended    0.50  0.55 1.02 1.52 
Honda 
Contract 
ended 
  0.30   2.5 4.63 4.93 
Mati F. Loan ended    0.45  1.3 2.41 2.86 
Poli Selling  -0.2 0.6   1.5 2.78 3.18 
Lapadula * Loaned     2.0 1.0 1.85 3.85 
Bertolacci Loaned      2.0 3.7 3.70 
Kucka Selling 5.0 3.0 1.0   1.5 2.78 6.78 
Pessina Selling 1.0 1.0    - - 1.0 
Vido  Selling 1.0 1.0    - - 1.0 
D. Lopez Selling 1.0 -    - - - 
De Sciglio 
** 
Selling 12.0 11.99    1.5 2.78 14.77 
Ely Selling 3.0 -1 2.0   0.8 1.48 2.48 
Vangioni Selling 1.70 1.14 0.10   0.8 1.48 2.72 
                                                 
71 Ibidem note 70 
81 
 
Bacca *** Loaned     2.0 3.5 6.48 8.48 
Crociata Selling 0.45 0.45    -  0.45 
J. Sosa **** Loaned     1.5 1.7 3.0 4.5 
Niang ***** Loaned     2.0 1.4 2.7 4.7 
TOTAL  25.15 17.38 4.0 1.90 7.5 21.9 39.83 70.61 
*Loan with € 11 mln obligation to purchase 
** The purchase price might be increased of a maximum of € 0.5 mln based on the conditions of the 
contract  
*** Loan with € 18/19 mln right to purchase 
**** Loan with € 4,5 mln obligation to purchase 
***** Loan with € 12 mln obligation to purchase + € 1 mln as bonus + 25% of the future reselling 
 
New purchases (including renewals of Donnarumma and Montella) will entail higher costs in 
2017/18 budget for € 116.8 mln. Outgoing market operations (the latest in order of time is the 
sale of Sosa to Trabznospor) will result in cost savings of € 70.61 mln. 
The balance should therefore result in higher costs in the 2017/18 budget for € 116.8 - € 70.61 
+ € 1.5= € 47.69 mln due to higher costs related to new players, lower costs related to the 
outgoing transfers and the revenue related to the player trading (capital gains and loans). 
 
In terms of total investments (outright players purchase + loans) Milan has invested more than 
€ 230 mln (cash and liquidity related, not accounting). The question here is spontaneous: how 
can Milan spend so much money for the transfer market? 
To answer this question we will deal with the cash account in order to undestand how many 
resources Milan has and where these resources come from. 
Second, we will analyse how Milan will be able to charge all the investements in the 2017/18 
financial report (this will be an accounting matter only). 
To understand where cash comes from it is necessary to go back at the end of 2016 when Milan 
was still owned by Fininvest.  
In December 2016 Milan had an outstanding debt position of € 73 mln to banks and € 109 mln 
to factoring corporations (cash advances disbursed against future cash-in contract). The net 
financial position was - € 178,395 mln in 2016 with a cash position of € 3,869 mln72.  
Before the closing took place Fininvest dispensed a € 73 mln credit line used to totally repay 
the bank position. The bank count went to zero but a new Fininvest’s account arised for the 
same amount.  
                                                 
72 Aida for Financial Statements 
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The closing took place on 14 April 2017. At the takeover date the new president Yonghong Li 
repaid the Fininvest’s debt with a loan issued by Rossoneri Sport Investment Lux73 to AC 
Milan. The financial resources used to liquidate Fininvest came from a € 300 mln loan 
distributed by the American hedge fund Elliott to Milan’s new president in order to conclude 
Milan’s takeover.  
Hence, AC Milan no longer had debts to the banking system at the closing date (only factoring 
debt remained) but it had a debt position to its controlling shareholder.  
On 18 May 2017 AC Milan’s general meeting approved two bonds issue respectively of € 73 
mln and € 55 mln. Both bonds have been wholly signed by Elliott through the subsidiary 
company Project RedBlack. 
With the first bond AC Milan repaid the loan account towards Rossoneri Sport Investment Lux. 
The second bond has been used for the transfer market. 
Furthermore, on 18 May, a general meeting approved a first € 60 mln capital increase of which 
Yonghong Li will wholly assume the responsibility in the light of its 99.93% stakeholding in 
the club.  
This capital increase has not been used to cover the € 72 mln income statement loss (related to 
the 2016’s financial statement) but it aimes at the financial and ownership strengthening of the 
club. Thus, it has been used for the transfer market.  
Hence, the total liquidity avalible for the summer market window was 55 + 60 = 115 mln. 
If we also considered loan revenue (€ 7.5 mln), total cash would be equal to € 122.5 mln. 
Without considering players acquired by loan operation (Milan only paid a rent for them) AC 
Milan has spent € 180.5 mln total amount for players’ registration right (see table above) with 
a maximun cash of € 122.5 mln. We can explain this situation supposing the following scenario. 
Payment for players bought with obligation to purchase will be postponed in future years. 
Players bought from the Italian championship with outright purchase will be paid into 
instalments. Players bought from foreign championships (Musacchio, Rodriguez, A. Silva and 
Calhanoglu) will be paid immediately. Here the rough computation (see the table above for 
data): 18 + 18 + 38 + 22 + 1.5 + 4 + 5 = 106.5. A € 16 mln cash position is still available to 
start paying the other spread debt positions (for instance Bonucci’s purchase for € 42 mln will 
be paid in three instalment of € 14 mln each).  
This explains how Milan has been able to spend so much for new players.  
 
                                                 
73 It is a private limited liability company funded on 21th December 2016, with an equity of Euro 12.000, used by the 
Chinese consortium to takeover AC Milan. The holding has as its object "the acquisition of shareholdings in Luxembourg or 
abroad of any company or enterprise in any form, and the management of such investments". 
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From an accounting point of view, as the CEO Fassone stated, Milan will charge all the 
investements made in 2017/18 financial statements. This is quite impropable and I want to show 
why.  
According to national accounting standards and N.O.I.F74 football clubs have to spread player’s 
cost along the whole footballer’s useful life. This is what depreciation means as already 
explained in par. 3.2.2. 
If this criteria was respected Bonucci’s purchase for € 42 mln with a 5 years contract would be 
amortized for € 8.4 mln in each of the five years of the contract (independently from the 
payment term – this is about cash and not accrual or bookkeping). 
This goes for the other new players as well. In term of depreciation at a constant rate Milan will 
be able to charge in the Income Statement € 41.4 mln (see the table above).  
Always in term of depreciation another amortization plan could be adopted which is the 
decreasing method.  
Accounting reccomendation n. 1 considers the depreciation method admissible both at constant 
and decreasing rate. 
Milan would be able to charge higher costs in the 2017/18 income statement by using the 
accelerated depreciation method only if all the depreciation charges are anchored to objective 
criteria in line with accounting principle proper implementation and the method is used for all 
the players in the fleet. Once adopted, the method will not be modified unless unexpected or 
extraordinary situations arise.  
The following table shows the decreasing depreciation method75. 
 
YEARS DEPRECIATION CHARGES - % 
5 40 % 30 % 20 % 7 % 3 % 
4 40 % 30 % 20 % 10 %  
3 50 % 30 %  20 %   
2 60 % 40 %    
 
With a 40% rate for all the new players and with a 50% rate only for Biglia (3 years contract), 
Milan charges in the income statement depreciation costs for € 73.9 mln (163.5 * 0.4 + 17 * 0.5 
= 65.4 + 8.5 = 73.9).  
                                                 
74 Norme Organizzative Interne Federali 
75 http://www.calcioefinanza.it/2017/09/01/come-fa-il-milan-a-caricare-sul-bilancio-2017-2018-tutti-i-costi-della-campagna-
acquisti/  
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By using this method Milan will charge about 41% of the total outright investment. If Milan 
used constant rates method it would charge only about 23%.   
More attention is necessary in the case of the loan with binding option to sign and, in particular, 
for Kessie (€ 8 mln for two-year loan + € 20 mln of obligation to purchase), Kalinic (€ 5 mln 
of loan + € 20 of obligation to purchase) and Borini (for free loan + € 6 mln obligation to 
purchase).  
These three players, not yet Milan’s owned assets, are not subject to depreciation procedure.  
In a normal accounting situation Milan would charge in the income statement only the loan-
related cost which amounts to € 9 mln. Therefore, the CEO’s intention is to charge in the IS “as 
much costs as possible”. The authorised solution by accounting principle is to record an accrual 
or a provision for future obligation recording in the IS a sum equal to how much Milan will 
have to spend to redeem these players in the future (accrual for € 46 mln). 
By adopting this solution the club will be able to record in the 2017/18 income statement the 
whole investement related to borrowed players considering that also the rental costs will be 
charged. The total cost will be 9 + 46 = 55 mln. 
This will allow a future benefit in term of financial performace. At the time of the release, the 
club will no longer charge any cost but it will rather record an increased value adjustment. This 
will have a positive impact on revenue equal to what was accrued in the previous years.  
Considering all the hypothesis done Milan will be able to charge as follows. 41,4 mln + 55 + 
12 (agents commissions) for a total of € 108,4 mln in the case constant rates depreciation. 73.9 
+ 55 + 12 for a total of € 140.9 mln in the case of decreasing rates depreciation.  
The decision to charge all the 2017/18 transfer market investements should be part of the 
executives’ strategy with a view to UEFA’s next interviews according to FFP regulations and 
Milan’s voluntary agreement76.  
AC Milan is indeed free from FFP’s constraints in 2017/18. Hence this is why the club has 
decided to invest a lot in the 2017’s market transfer window trying to charge in the IS as much 
costs as possible exploiting this kind of “grace”.  
 
4.2 JUVENTUS’ FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
Juventus is the healthiest Italian club if we look at current and recent performance. 
After the 2006’s scandal (Calciopoli) the club has started an unbroken growth process. It has 
opened the door to the very good current results.  
With steady growth in revenue, the club has returned to invest heavily on the transfers market 
especially in the last two summer sessions. The investments made allowed Juventus to reach 
                                                 
76 UEFA Club licensing and financial fair play regulations for voluntary agreement definition.  
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two champions finals over the past three years (without ever winning) and to win seven 
champiosnhips. 
Now let’s see the investments made in the 2016/17 and 2017/18 market sessions (the two 
sessions with more investments). 
The executives of the Turin club have always invested intelligently spending on the basis of the 
revenue earned and not relying on external funding sources. For this reason, despite the large 
investments, the revenue-costs relation in the last two years is very balanced. 
The 2016 market transfer was characterized by Pogba’s sale to Manchester United for € 110 
mln and the subsequent Higuain’s purchase from Napoli for € 94 mln. If we add Morata's 
transfer to Real Madrid for € 30 mln and Pjanic’s and Pjaca’s purchases for € 30 mln and € 23 
mln respectively, we note that the balance reflects what was said above. The balance of these 
five transactions is as follow: (94 + 23 + 30) - (105 + 30) = 12 mln. 
Taking into account all transactions carried out in 2016/17, the final purchases amount to € 
160.9 million (€ 123.5 mln in 2015) while outright sales amount to € 158.7 million (€ 54.5 
million in 2015). Loan transactions has not been considered. If we did, total figures would be 
even higher (for instance Cuadrado has been bought with a € 5 mln loan plus an obligation to 
purchase of € 25 mln and Zaza has been sold with a € 2 mln loan plus an obligation to purchase 
of 20 mln). Once again the balance is almost equal to zero77. 
 
The market transfer investment trend does not change in the 2017’s summer window.  
Mentioned data are recent and not official yet, for this reason numbers will be based on press 
releases published on the Juventus’ site or on reliable journalistic sources. 
Juventus bought 8 new players for a total investment of € 98.2 mln. The amount rises to € 135.2 
mln if we consider Cuadrado and Benatia’s obligation to purchase. 
From the outgoing players point of view Juventus sold 9 footballers for a total amout of € 87.4 
(outright sales plus loans). Once again, the balance is in equilibrium.  
We now analyze the transfers market impact on 2017/18 financial statement in term of higher 
gross employees costs, depreciation and income capital gain.  
The following table shows the costs comparison in relation to the last two seasons. 
                                                 
77 All data have been obtain from Juventus’s financial report at 31 December 2016 + Calcio e Finanza on 
http://www.calcioefinanza.it/2016/09/01/juventus-saldo-calciomercato-2016-2017-impatto-su-bilancio/  
Gross employees costs 2017/18 155.03 
Gross employees costs 2016/17 130.06 
Absolute variation 24.98 
Variation % 19% 
86 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The outright purchase of new players with important values such as Bernardeschi and the sale 
of footballers who, like Bonucci, had a low budget amortization should bring to an increase in 
this cost item on the 2017/18 financial statement. 
In detail, amortization should increase from € 61.18 mln to € 89.73 mln (an increase of € 28.55 
mln, equal to 46%) while loan cost should rise from € 8 mln (5 for Cuadrado and 3 for Benatia) 
to 9.5 mln (6 million for Douglas Costa and 3.5 million for Howedes). 
Considering the market transactions during the 2017/18 summer transfer campaign, Dybala’s 
renewal and the release of Cuadrado and Benatia, the extended cost of the team (gross wages + 
amortization + loan cost) for the 2017/18 season is € 254.26 mln (155.03 million gross wages 
+ 99.23 amortization and loan costs) up by € 55.02 mln if compared to € 199.24 mln in 2016/17. 
From the positive income components point of view Juventus got € 72.39 mln income gains 
plus € 3 mln of loan revenue.  
 
PLAYERS OPERATION 
SELLING 
PRICE 
INCOME 
GAIN/LOSS 
LOAN RECEIPT 
Bonucci Sale – Milan 42 39,504 - 
Neto * Sale – Valencia 6 4.7 - 
D. Alves Termination of contract 0 -0.118 - 
Donis Sale - Stoccarda 3 2.9 - 
S. Ganz Sale – Pescara 1.8 1.8 - 
Cassata Sale – Sassuolo 7 6.6 - 
Romagna Sale – Cagliari 7.6 7.6 - 
Lemina ** Sale – Southampton 17 9.4 - 
Rincon *** Loan - Torino 0 0 3 
TOTAL  84.4 72,386 3 
*the payment due may increase of € 1 mln upon the occurrence of specific conditions 
** the selling price may increase of € 3 mln upon the occurrence of specific conditions 
***€ 3 mln loan + € 6 mln obligation to purchase 
Depreciaton/loan costs 2017/18 99.23 
Depreciation/loan costs 2016/17 69.18 
Absolute variation 30.05 
Variation % 43% 
Exyended cost of the team 2017/18 254.26 
Extended cost of the team 2016/17 199.24 
Absoluet variation 55.02 
Variation % 28% 
Datas in milion of euros  
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The € 55.02 mln increase in the cost of the team is therefore more than offset by capital gains 
revenue (€ 72.39 mln) and loans collection (€ 3 mln). 
The impact on Juventus’ budget in 2017/18 given as difference between higher costs related to 
the transfers market (€ 55.02 mln) and higher revenue (€ 72.39 mln gains + € 3 mln loan 
installments) is therefore positive for € 20.36 mln. 
Although the summer market window closed with a positive impact of € 20.36 mln, the 
extended cost of the team must be balanced by an increase in typical revenues. 
 
The financial statements at 30 June 2017 will close with revenue above € 500 mln. This result 
was possible thanks to € 150 mln capital gains realized in 2016/17 (above all Pogba’s sale to 
Manchester United) and the Champions League proceeds. 
The Juventus’ budget in 2016/17 recorded revenue (including capital gains) of € 562.7 mln 
increased by 45.1% compared to € 387.9 mln in 2015/16, a fast-growing net profit of € 42.6 
mln compared to € 4.2 mln of the previous season. This is the third consecutive positive year 
for Juventus. 
In detail, net of the € 151.15 mln deriving from the management of the footballers fleet, in 
2016/17 Juventus’ typical revenue was € 411.56 million, an absolute record for a Serie A’s 
club. This confirms what was said above in relation to increase the typical revenue. 
The detailed situation is shown below78. 
 
Amounts in Euros 2016/17 2015/16 Variation 
Matchday revenue 57,835,297 43,667,912 14,167,385 
TV broadcast 232,773,784 194,897,031 37,876,753 
Sponsorship 74,718,794 70,008,038 4,710,756 
Merchandising 19,198,979 13,509,887 5,689,092 
Players’ rights revenue 151,149,536 43,403,703 104,745,833 
Other revenue 27,034,664 19,414,202 7,620,462 
Total 562,711,054 387,900,773 174,810,281 
 
Matchday revenue, due to the increased number of home games played in the 2016/17 season 
compared to 2015/16, has increased from € 14.16 mln to € 57.83 mln exceeding the record 
reached in 2014/15 thanks to an higher number of Champions League games. 
                                                 
78 2016/17 Juventus’ financial statements, available on: http://www.juventus.com/media/native/investor-relations-
docs/Italiano/comunicati/2017/comunicato%2022092017%20approvazione%20bozza%20bilancio%20ita.pdf    
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On the commercial revenue side, Juventus’ choice to internalize licensing and merchandising 
activities and partnership agreements signed in the previous season had a positive impact on 
sales, totaling € 93.92 mln (€ 74 mln revenue from sponsorships and advertising and € 19.19 
mln as sales of products and licenses). 
TV rights revenue reached € 232.77 mln. Thanks to Champions League path, Juventus reached 
the huge amount of € 110 mln79 just the European competition.  
Overall, the Juventus’ revenue structure is still heavily unbalanced in favor of the television 
rights component where a relevant part is related to Champions League. 
TV rights revenue account for 56% of Juventus' typical revenue in the 2016/17 financial year. 
Commercial revenue is the second revenue item (23%) while matchdays line item is only 14%. 
7% is represented by "other revenues" (usually this includes income from certain business 
activities but also insurances for players' injuries, various contributions, etc.). 
The last five seasons’ total revenues have increased contantly. If we look at the 2012-2017 
income statement, revenue has increased on an average rate of 22%. Matchday revenue, 
merchandising and players capital gains recorded the higher percentage increase per year80.  
Looking at the costs trend in the last five seasons, personnel costs and depreciation have 
increased the most. The table shows the results81.  
 
COST/SEASON 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 
Employees costs 235,34582 221,484 198,430 184,091 163,463 
Depreciation 92,884 76,331 66,351 59,062 59,800 
Total operating 
costs 
495,334 377,700 330,157 306,329 286,355 
Total % variation 31% 14% 8% 7% 6% 
 
On average, total costs increase of 8.2% per year. This means that the final turnover is totally 
able to repay the costs in each of the last five seasons (22% > 13.2 %) and further a net positive 
result is available to cover other expenses. You can see a constant increase of costs from 2013 
to 2016. The higher variation, from 2016 to 2017, is due not only to employees costs and 
depreciation but in particolar to fees paid to FIFA’s agent for services concerning players’ 
                                                 
79 http://it.uefa.com/uefachampionsleague/news/newsid=2512612.html  
80 Aida for financial statement datas. https://aida.bvdinfo.com/Report.serv?_CID=29&context=33VOED7X17DF1TV  
81 The end of the financial year is at 30 June. Only employees costs and depreciation have been considered because they are 
the costs components with the highest burden in the income statement. Data from 2013 to 2016 have been taken from Aida. 
82 Data are not official yet but they have been taken from balance sheet’s approval at 30 June 2017 (press release - PDF 
version: http://www.juventus.com/media/native/investor-relations-
docs/Italiano/comunicati/2017/comunicato%2022092017%20approvazione%20bozza%20bilancio%20ita.pdf.   
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registration right and the acquisition or renewal of players’ rights. Such value increases from € 
10,941 mln in 2016 to € 50,492 mln in 2017.  
Even if costs are continuosly increased, revenues have covered such growth. The ability to 
cover costs with revenue is confirmed also by the operating profit. 
This line item moves from a negative value in 2013 (- € 4.443 mln) from a positive one in 2014 
(€ 6.655 mln) continuing to be positive until 2017 (operating profit of € 67.377 mln). 
The last line item to analyze is net profit after tax which is the most important one. Also in this 
case Juventus shows a positive economic trend. The last negative net profit is dated back to 
2014’s financial statement (- € 6.674 mln). This negative result is not so bad if compared to the 
2012 and 2011’s net result respectively of - € 48,654 mln and - € 95,414 mln. 
In the last three years the situation has changed. In 2015 and 2016 the net profit was respectively 
of € 2,298 mln and € 4,062 mln but the best performance was obtained in 2017 with a final net 
result of € 42,568 mln, the highest in Juventus’ history.  
The values presented make Juventus the Italian club with the best economic position in term of 
financial performance, total revenue and net profit. The constant increase in revenue in 
particular from 2015 to 2017 justifies not only the huge growth in employees costs and 
depreciation but especially the massive summer market transfer of the last two years.  
Juventus reached this performance thanks in particular to capital income gains and Champions 
League broadcasting revenue which turn out to be essential for an Italian club.  
The negative aspect which Juventus should pay more attention to is the indebteness position 
both towards banks and other clubs. This account includes loans and other financial debts 
related to mortgages for the construction of the stadium, debts to banks, factoring debts and 
leasing debts to Unicredit for the construction of Vinovo’s training center (this debt has been 
totally repaid in 2017). Current debts (within 12 months) are not a problem because its cash 
position at 30 June 2017 is enough to cover the indebtedness position. The current cash 
available is about € 140 mln against a total current debt of € 112.7 mln. Hence a positive net 
financial position of 140 – 112.7 = € 27.3 mln. The current NFP is getting better if compared 
to 2016 and 2015, respectively of - € 48.7 mln and - € 146.602 mln. 
More attention should be paid to non current financial debt (over 12 months) which amount is 
about € 193.9 mln. These are the debt Juventus will face in future financial years (to which 
other debt might be added). The cash position in the long run is not available yet but considering 
the huge amount of future debt it shall be more consinsent than the actual one. Thanks to a well-
organized and precise club management I personally think Juventus will be able to pay the 
future loans without incurring any difficulties.  
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Furthermore, the value of overdue payables towards other clubs is increasing both current and 
non current debt. This increase is justified by the huge investements made in the last two transfer 
market windows. Current and non current account receivables towards clubs won’t fully repay 
account payables. For this reason Juventus shall keep increasing total revenue in order to 
increase the cash needed to repay the future debt.  
In order to reduce the financial debt and the relative interests Juventus might adopt other 
solutions such as increase the equity or resort to sale and lease back operations, renegotiate the 
interest rate of the mortgage or loans and only as a last resort selling the best players.  
However, having a high level of debt is not negative. Taking out a loan means having other 
financial resources to be used in the activity. A good management of the debt position and the 
ability to pay back the interests are necessary in order to repay the oustanding debt and to obtain 
other financings. This means having other financial resources available to be invested in order 
to enhance the club performance (considered as a continuos flow of money). In this scenario a 
growing diversified level of revenue is fundamental and this is exactly what Juvenuts has been 
doing in recent years. 
 
4.3 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS INDEXES EVALUATION OF MILAN AND 
JUVENTUS 
This paragraph shows a comparison between Milan and Juventus in terms of financial indexes 
in order to identify the reciprocal health condition. 
I decided to take into consideration the 2015’s and 2016’s values because financial information 
is more reliable. The indexes considered are the most important and more relevant to a football 
club. After showing the numerical results I will explain each index and its meaning. The table 
below shows the situation of the two Italian clubs83. 
 
RATIO FORMULA 
MILAN JUVENTUS 
2016 2015 2016 2015 
ROE Net profit / Equity n.c. n.c. 7.61% 5.15% 
ROA EBIT / Total Asset -16.51% -21.61% 1.46% 2.84% 
ROS EBIT / Revenue84 -36.64% -59.42 2.18% 3.92% 
Total Solvency Total asset / Total debt 1.14 1.22 1.15 1.13 
                                                 
83 ROE, ROA and ROS have been reported as stated by Aida. The other indexes have been calculated from Milan and 
Juventus’ annual report (data always taken from Aida).  
84 Revenue = (VoP+FAR) = value of production plus financial asset revenue  
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Ownership solidity NFP85 / Equity 40.36 4.49 3.73 4.23 
Indebtedness Total liabilities / Equity 106.34 15.39 10.82 10.62 
Cash availability 
Current Assets / Current 
Liabilities86 
0.41 0.48 0.54 0.55 
Employees costs 
Employees costs / Total 
revenue 
67.09% 73.19% 64.86% 52.77% 
Depreciation 
Incidence 
Depreciation / Total costs 15.67% 17.38% 17.14% 15.95% 
Depreciation and 
wage incidence 
Depreciation + wages / 
Total costs 
65.44% 67.05% 73.53% 74.53% 
Economy Total revenues / Total costs 95.72% 87.53% 111.56% 119.56% 
 
ROE means Return on Equity. It shows the whole profitability of a company (of a football club 
in this case) and the level of risk remuneration faced by the owner(s) or by the members. It 
refers to the entire business management. It takes into consideration both ordinary and 
extraordinary management (this because it uses the net profit as numerator. The net profit is the 
final result after considering all the line items). 
This index must be positive in order to express a good judgement. Positive means the club 
obtained a net profit. Negative means the club obtained an economic loss. This is exactly the 
situation shown above.  
In 2016 and 2015 (the last two years of Berlusconi’s presidency) Milan reported such huge 
losses in the income statement that the index can not be computed (too negative). In the case of 
Milan this index has continuosly reported a negative value due to constant economic losses in 
the recent years. This means Milan is not a profitable club at all. However, this is not new 
because the majority of the Italian clubs have recently recorded financial losses. Operating in 
loss situation is becoming a constant in Italy and this means clubs are not able to reach the 
minimum level of profitability (revenue equals to costs). 
The Juventus’ situation is different. As mentioned above Juventus is the healthiest and well-
managed Italian club.  
Juventus’ ROE shows a good level of profitability in 2016 and 2015. After years characterized 
by economic losses the club has been able to reach a good level of stability recording a net 
profit in the last three years (also in 2017 – € 42.6 mln – ROE will be much higher). The index 
                                                 
85 NFP = net financial position. This value has been taken from 2016’ annual financial for Juventus and from Aida foo 
Milan. 
86 This index does not take into account current financial debt and current financial assets. 
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has increased from 2015 to 2016 and this means Juventus is not only the more profitable club 
in Italy but it is also becoming more profitable year by year. I think Juvents will continue on 
this level of financial performance also for the coming years. 
 
ROA means Return on Assets. It shows the profitability of the invested capital. It also shows 
how much the ordinary management yields which is expressed by the operating profit. It is an 
operating profit because it only includes typical revenue and costs (the difference between 
typical revenue and costs makes exactly the operating profit). 
From a strictly accounting point of view this index is part of ROE computation (ROE can be 
broken down in other three indicators among which ROA is the most important one). This 
means the higher the value of ROA the higher the level of ROE in both positive and negative 
terms.  
Milan has a negative ROA. It means the club recorded a negative operating profit in the two 
years considered (and in the previous ones). This index is extremely negative and this is one of 
the reasons why ROE can not be computed otherwise the computation would be meaningless. 
The more negative the operating profit is the more negative net profit and ROA will be and, as 
a consequence, the more negative ROE will be.  
This index shows a situation in which Milan has invested equity and financial resources in a 
wrong way without obtaining any kind of profitability.  
On the other side Juventus reached a good level of ROA thanks to positive operating profits in 
2016 and 2015. It is quite unusual that the value of ROA from 2015 to 2016 has decreased while 
ROE has increased. This can be explained as follows. It means that other indexes have 
contributed to enhance the value of ROE such as the index of extraordinary management 
incidence. This index is computed as a percentage relation between net profit and operating 
profit. The higher this ration the higher the financial and extraordinary management will be and 
hence the ROE. As we know football club net profit also includes income from players capital 
gain. This income component was very important and consisent in Juventus’ last financial 
statements and in particular in 2017 and 2016.  
The good level of Juventus’ ROA means the club is investing capital and financial resources in 
a very profitable way.  
 
ROS means Return on Sales. It shows the profitable of a single sale. In the case of football club 
the revenue composition is quite diversified and usually divided into more than five categories. 
The index measures the profitability of the operating activities of a club which, for the purposes 
of this analysis, include clubs’ players trading result. Furthermore, the value concerns the 
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relation between sales volume, costs and prices. It depends on both internal efficiency and 
external market.  
As ROA is part of ROE’s breakdown, ROS is part of ROA’s (ROA can be broken down in ROS 
and assets rotation computed as total revenue over total assets).  
Once again, having Milan a negative operating profit, this index is extremely bad and it shows 
that club’s sales are not profitable. Milan should consistently increase revenue and limit costs 
in order to make sales more profitable and to obtain a positive ratio. Due to very inadequate 
results I think Milan might not be able to solve the situation in the short run but instead it will 
need at least three-five years of revenue growth and cost-saving policies.  
Juventus has a positive operating profit and hence a good and well-performed index. This means 
the club is profitable and it is able to generate earnings with respect to the total outcome. For 
this reason Juventus is a club stakeholders should invest in.  
 
Total solvency ratio shows the relation between total assets and total debts. A football club is 
creditworthy when total assets are higher than total debts. The higher this ratio the more solvent 
a club is. The more this ratio is close to 1 the more a club gets into debt. If the index is equal to 
1 it means all the club’s patrimony is debt (assets = debt). 
Milan and Juventus are both creditworthy and show similar values. This means both clubs 
would be able to repay the debt with their own assets.  
Milan would not be able to repay the debt using only current assets because the debt is too high 
when compared with account receivables. This means the club should draw on the sale of its 
non current assets such as players’ registration rights and financial assets.  
Also Juventus recorded a huge amount of debt in the financial statement. Juventus is more 
solvent than Milan because, even if it has a higher financial debt, it has also higher players’ 
registration rights, tangible assets such as property facilities and equipment (the property of the 
stadium and the land) and equity.  
 
Ownership solidity index evaluates the proportion between net financial position (third parties’ 
debts net of financial assets as shareholding) and equity. Net financial position is calculated as 
the difference between cash and both short and long run financial debts (towards banks and 
other investor).  
Both clubs have a negative NFP (this means financial debt higher than cash).  
If this index is bigger than 1 it means the club is not able to repay the financial debt with its 
own resources (equity). This is the case of both teams taken into consideration.  
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 Milan’s index in 2016 stands out in our analysis. A higher NFP and a reduction in Equity in 
2016 made this index worse than 2015. 
This ratio uses to be higher for football clubs than for normal firms. They are characterised by 
more intangible (players) than tangible assets, higher level of indebtedness (towards 
shareholders and banks) and lower value of equity because of higher amount of economic losses 
and frequent capitalisations or provisions by the ownership. Indebtedness may be reduced in 
two ways. The first is with contributions by shareholders in order to replenish financial losses 
and repay debt positions. The consequence of these contributions is that sooner or later the 
owner will stop providing financial resources (money is not endless). The second possibility is 
to reduce the value of players’ registration rights but this will have a reduction in the solidity 
of the club as consequence.  
For all these reasons Milan and Juve can not to be considered solid from a financial point of 
view because of their substantial level of debt. They are solid from a patrimonial point of view 
because the sum of tangible, intangible and financial assets is enough to cover the NFP even if 
this solution can not be considered sustainable. Juventus is also solid from an economic point 
of view because revenues were higher than costs in the last two years while Milan is not.  
The same reasoning can be sustained for the  indebtedness index between total liabilities and 
equity. Total liabilities are always higher than NFP and for this reason this ratio is even worse 
than the solidity one.  
This index confirms that both clubs make frequnt use of indebtedness policies. Furthermore, it 
shows an unbalanced situation between equity and debts.  
 
Cash availability or liquidity index shows the relation between current assets and current 
liabilites. In the computation both short term financial assets and liabilities are not considered.  
This index means the ability of a company or a club to repay short term commercial debt 
(towards footballers in the case of football) by using current credits and cash available. This 
ratio should assume a value between 1 and 2. If it is lower than 1 it means the club is not able 
to pay off short term debt with current assets. 
Furthermore, the index reflects the solidity of a club in the short term and hence it is linked with 
the ownership solidity index. If the club has a good patrimonial solidity, the liquidity index 
shows a positive correlation between current assets and current liabilities. This is not our case 
because both indexes show that Milan and Juventus are neither solid nor able to repay short 
term liabilities.  
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The last four indexes refer to economic indicators. 
Employees costs index refers to the operative efficiency of a football club and it is used on an 
international level. The lower this value the more efficient the club will be. 
The numerator includes employees costs while the denominator includes typical income 
components such as matchdays, TV broacasts and commercial. Typical revenue does not 
include capital gain from players sales. 
According to FFP and European Club Association the maximun level allowed of this indicator 
is 70%. A value below this percentage means that the club is well-managed. A value above this 
percentage means employees costs carry too much weight in the income statement and they 
must be reduced. 
Juventus has an indicator quite below the threshold in both years. Milan is out of the parameters 
in 2015 and it remains below the limit in 2016 due to cost reduction policies. 
In other words, Juventus can have a team with higher employees costs than Milan because it is 
able to generate just as high tytpical revenue.  
Another useful indicator is depreciation incidence. It is the ratio between players’ registration 
rights depreciation in the numerator and total costs in the denominator. Total costs include also 
financial interests and players write-downs. 
This index shows the level of depreciation incidence over the total costs. It is a very adequate 
indicator because it shows the rigidity of the investements in football players. This ratio is quite 
similar for both Milan and Juventus in both years and it is acceptable (16% on average for both). 
If we add to the previous index’s numerator also the employess costs, which is the second most 
relevant cost component, we end up with a different conclusion. In this case it is possible to 
observe the incidence of human capital in the club. This incidence is higher for Juventus (more 
than 70%) than for Milan (less than 70%). This means Juventus has made more investments in 
the recent years paying higher wages than Milan.  
The last index aims to measure the level of economy of a football team. It is given by the relation 
between typical revenue in the numerator and depreciation plus employess costs in the 
denominator. If this index is higher than 100% it means that typical revenues are higher than 
the costs considered. If this index is lower than 100% means typical income components are 
not enough to cover the main cost components. Milan’s depreciation and wages are higher than 
typical revenue and this explains why the club has recorded economic losses in the last years. 
Juventus instead has the typical revenues higher than costs demostrating once again that 
Juventus is managed better than Milan. 
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In conclusion we can say that Juventus reaches better financial performance tha Milan in term 
of revenue and profitability. Juventus’ equity has been better invested and this is shown by both 
a positive operating profit and a net income. Milan suffered from the austerity policies of the 
last years and from the reduction of financial resources by the old presidency. In term of revenue 
both clubs should better exploit their own brands in particular in foreign countries such as Asia 
and America. Furthermore, they should better diversify revenue and be less dependant on 
footballers capital gains. This is especially the Juventus’ case. The club has been able to 
diversify revenue thanks to the new privately owned stadium but at the same time it still depends 
on capital gains and broacasting revenue essential to reach a positive net result.  
Both clubs have a consistent indebtedness position in common. Debts are not a problem if 
recapitalised or reinvested in order to increase revenue or to build new facilities. This is exactly 
the reason why Juventus differs from Milan. The indebtedness and the refinancing of the debt 
allowed Juventus to deal with financial needs arising from operating management, new 
increasing investements and short-term financial debts. 
Thanks to higher revenue from the owned stadium and a better management of the debt position 
Juventus has been able to obtain better financial performance than Milan at this time. We will 
see if Milan thanks to the change of the ownership will be able to outperfom Juventus in the 
incoming years. However, I personally think Milan will reach better financial results than the 
ones obtained so far. 
 
4.4 EUROPE TOP CLUBS’ REVENUE GROWTH IN 2017 AND COMPARISONS 
WITH THE PREVIOUS YEARS 
The following analysis shows revenue growth for 2016/15, 2015/14 and 2013/14 season in 
relation to the Europe top clubs. Economic and financial datas of 2016/17 season have not been 
considered because not reliable and not yet official. However, they will be mentioned and 
estimated later in order to provide a 2017’s background. Revenue excludes players transfer fees, 
VAT and other sale related taxes. Some adjustments have been made to revenue values to 
enable a more meaningful comparison of the football business on a club by club basis. 
As reported by Deloitte UK Sport Football Money League 2016 and 2017, the table below 
highlights the top clubs revenue trend in the three seasons considered showing the ups and 
downs in the positions. The table shows only the first ten positions but later on in the analysis 
references to the top 20 will be carried on. 
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Revenue growth in 2015/16, 2014/15, 2013/1487 
P 2015/16 2015/16 2014/15 P Variation 2013/14 P Variation 
1 Manchester Utd 689.0 519.5 3 169.5 518.0 2 1.5 
2 Barcelona 620.2 560.8 2 59.4 484.4 4 76.4 
3 Real Madrid 620.1 577.0 1 43.1 549.5 1 27.5 
4 Bayern Munich 592.0 474.0 5 118 487.5 3 -13.5 
5 Manchester City 524.9 463.5 6 61.4 416.5 6 47.0 
6 Paris Saint-Germain 520.9 480.8 4 40.1 471.3 5 9.5 
7 Arsenal 468.5 435.5 7 33.0 359.3 8 76.2 
8 Chelsea 447.4 420.0 8 27.4 387.9 7 32.1 
9 Liverpool 403.8 391.8 9 12.0 305.9 9 85.9 
10 Juvenuts 341.1 323.9 10 17.2 279.0 10 44.9 
 
With respect to 2013/14 the 2014/15 season sees another year of ups and downs in the financial 
pecking order. The top five clubs continue to dominate the ranking. 
The top ten remains stable with no new entrants. Most notably, Barcelona leapfrogs both 
Manchester United and Bayern Munich to return to second position behind Real Madrid, 
becoming the third club to break the € 500 mln revenue barrier in the process. Bayern Munich 
dropped to fifth position overtaken by Paris Saint Germain.  
Real Madrid claims the top spot for the eleventh consecutive year with revenue of € 577 mln, 
which are not matched with on-pitch success, relinquishing the Champions League to the rival 
Barcelona.  
Barcelona enjoyed a very successful season on the pitch winning both Liga title and Champions 
League. Revenue growth from the European triumph also resulted in Barca regaining the second 
position in the money league from Manchester United. 
Bayern Munich continue to be one of the three clubs to be ever present in the money league but 
at the same time it is the only one to have recorded a reduction in total revenue from the previous 
season. The Bavarians no longer outperformed their biggest international rivals in commercial 
area and now faced a very strong competition to regain one of the top three places in the coming 
years. 
The number of English clubs in the top 20 has increased from eight to nine. 
Chelsea won the 2014/15’s Premier League but its off-pitch position has been usurped by 
Arsenal in terms of total outcome.  
                                                 
87 Deloitte UK sport football money league 2016 and 2017 pdf. P means position in the ranking 
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Manchester United’s strong commercial growth, underpinned by its ability to agree on new 
impressive sponsorship deals, compensated to a certain extent for its Champions League 
absence in 2014/15.  
Paris Saint Germain remains the only French club in the top 20 moving up a position to fourth, 
the highest ever for a French club.  
Juventus continued its domestic dominance that, coupled with its run to the Champions League 
final, has helped the club to achieve a total revenue growth of 16%, and mantained a place in 
the money league, increasing the revenue gap between itself and the eleventh position by over 
€ 40 mln.  
Total revenue reached € 6.6 billion representing an increase of 8% on the previous year’s top 
20 clubs.  
To gain a place in the top 20, substantial broadcast revenue continues to be critical especially 
that generated from participation to UEFA Champions League. 
The ratio of the three principal revenue stream remains broadly constant in regard to the prior 
season with clubs generating 19% of their total revenue from matchday sources, 40% from 
broadcasts and 41% from commercials. With further increases expected in broadcast and 
commercial revenue in the coming years, I would expect the revenue a club generates from 
matchday to fall in significance even further than its current low record.  
 
In 2015/16 season three teams broke down the limit of € 600 mln revenue for the first time. 
Manchester United has regained top spot in the rank for the first time since 2003/04 after eleven 
years of Spanish dominance with a revenue record of € 689 mln. The top three clubs in the 
ranking are the same as in 1996/97 but Manchester United, Real Madrid and Barcelona in 
2015/16 collectively generated over seven times the revenue they did in the last season.  
For the third consecutive year, the same clubs are in the top ten  but five of them have changed 
position. Real Madrid and Manchester United swap places, Paris Saint Germain slips two places 
to sixth position while Bayern Munich jumps to fourth position and Manchester City climbs 
one place up to fifth, their highest even position.  
Out of the top 10 we can find team such as Milan, Borussia Dortmund, Tottenham, Atletico 
Madrid, Internazionale, Roma, Zenit Saint Petersburg and Leicester which either way 
contribute to top 20’s total revenue. 
The total revenue for the 20 top clubs breaks another record and it is the first time that combined 
revenue of the top teams have exceeded € 7 billion. This a 12% increase on the previous year’s 
top 20 (€ 7.4 billion in 2015/16 and € 6.6 billion in 2014/15). Out of € 0.8 billion total increase, 
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49% is due to broadcast revenue, 42% to commercial revenue and only 9% due to matchday 
revenue. 
According to Deloitte UK Sport Football Money League 2017, to gain a place in the top 20, a 
club must generate revenues of € 172 mln at least which represents an increse of 4% with respect 
to the previous season. The 20th position is taken by Leicester which made its first appearance 
in the Money League generating € 172.1 mln. Leicester’s on-pitch success (Premier League 
title) has translated into financial gain with a revenue increase of 23%.  
Stepping back to the first positions and to the table above we can find a sort of English clubs 
dominance with 5 teams out of the top 10. Manchester United has always been the highest 
placed English club. Its ability to generate more commercial revenues than its rivals continues 
to be the primary factor behind its success. in 2015/16 season  Red Devils generated commercial 
revenue of € 363.8 mln (€ 263.8 in the previous season with an increase of € 100 mln) equal to 
53% of the total outcome.  
With Manchester City’s climb to fifth position this is the first time that England has had two 
clubs in the top 5 since 2011/12. City also became one of the only six clubs to have ever 
generated revenue in excess of € 500 mln.  
Arsenal, Chelsea and Liverpool retain their positions of seventh, eighth and ninth respectively.  
With the weakening of the Pound against the Euro following the UK’s decision to leave the 
European Union, I think it may be very challenging for English clubs to remain at the top in the 
coming years. 
Paris Saint Germain remains the only French club in the 2015/16’s top 20 slipping two positions 
compared to the previous season. The club has also lost its claim for the highest commercial 
revenue (€ 305.3 mln) losing its title to Manchester United and Bayern Munich in second place 
(€ 342.6 mln). However, PSG’s commercial revenue is going to increase thanks to Neymar’s 
purchase whose effect will bring a higher volume of t-shirt and gadget sales. 
Bayern Munich recorded the second largest overall revenue increase of any of top 20 clubs and 
it is the only German club to have held a permanent position in the Money League. 
Regarding Italian clubs Juventus has kept the tenth position with its revenue growing by 10%. 
Juventus has led the way in Italy developing its own stadium and performing strongly on the 
pitch which has allowed it to maintain its position.  
Italian clubs continue to be affected by Champions League broadcast revenue and this is the 
reason why Milan and Internazionale are losing position in the ranking. Matchday revenue 
growth is still constrained by lack of widespread investement in stadiums. This is why three out 
of the four Italian clubs are in the bottom positions for matchday stadium revenue. Despite 
individual efforts to change this, there is a possibility that Milan and Internazionale will drop 
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out of the Money League in the next seasons. At the same time thanks to changes of ownership 
(they both have Chinese ownership now and aim at increasing future revenue) there is 
possibility that the Milanese teams will climb the rank reaching higher positions.  
 
I expect this will be a revenue record year, driven by increased broadcast and commercial 
income components, to be eclipsed next year. New domestic broadcast deals started in 2016/17 
for Premier League and La Liga clubs (as well as international broadcast deals for the Premier 
League) mean that the next Money League will see the € 8 mln barrier broken. The weakened 
Pound will ensure a close three-way fight among Manchester United, Real Madrid, Barcelona, 
Bayern Munich and Paris Saint Germain for the top positions. 
Whilst European football dominates financially, the landscape may change considerably in the 
longer term because of attractive and emerging football markets that will become the future 
football superpowers. 
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CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION 
In view of the above I would say the future football continuity will be mostly and precisely 
based on economic and financial equilibrium. The introduction of Financial Fair Play 
regulations and the lack in future financial resources will force football clubs to review and 
limit economic dynamics, expenditures and investments. The executives will be obliged to 
restructuring financial operations on the basis of availabe resources.  
In this context, the financial statement will assume much more importance since it will be 
considered not only an element for an adeguate accounting information but also fundamental 
for the club’s business strategy.  
The resulting budget and the indexes, from both national and international sporting laws and 
regulations, will have to determine a sharp change of perspective for its users. This category 
includes not only third parties interested in controlling financial sustainability and commitments 
(suppliers, other clubs, customers or fans) but also federal institutions responsible for verifying 
regular participation in the competitions. 
The budget will be a kind of "compass" to allow management to develop projects and programs 
(sports and financial) consistent with the economic equilibrium. 
The use of the budget must definitively abandon the pure accounting concept by making it more 
suitable for dynamic and strategic assessments rather than static ones. More attention will be 
paid to creative accounting policies with the aim of limiting their use and making the budgets 
more truthful and correct. Clubs should take decisions to implement management policies to 
make the company more solid, effective and efficient. All clubs should pursue internal self-
financing rather than indebtedness. Of course this path will not be immediately feasible for 
football clubs as their vision is still football-oriented and not profit-oriented. 
The same introduction of Financial Fair Play will require an interpretive and adaptive effort by 
both UEFA and the National Federations in order to allow a uniform application of the rules. 
As in the Italian case with the issuance of specific accounting principles and a chart of accounts, 
the new legislation should be introduced with great caution within the legislative framework. 
In terms of accounting and taxation the UEFA’s area is characterized by a very heterogeneous 
set of standards in force. If this apparent practical deviation is not overcome, any attempt of 
reform will lead to extreme and prolonged conflicts among the various systems. In short, only 
budget values and indexes will not be sufficient. Football system will especially need strategic 
commercial behaviour. By carefully evaluating the balance between revenues and costs it will 
be possible to operate according to sustainable sports programs in the short and medium term. 
Investments in particular will have to be mainly oriented to club consolidation. On one hand all 
the opportunities deriving from an intensive facilities management (stadiums and or sports 
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centers) shall be exploited. On the other hand all projects aiming at the creation of a high quality 
youth sector will be encouraged and they will have to be able to support club ambitions. 
Furthermore, clubs should adopt revenue diversification policy in order to make all the sources 
of income more reliable. This is necessary whether a club wants to grow and survive regardless 
of sporting results. They are crucial but unpredictable variables and thus a club can not be based 
only on these to be sustainable. 
Football sector is extremely competitive nowadays. Hence, I think the presence of high-skilled 
management is fundamental for the club’s survival and to reach economy and sustainability 
principles. 
In my opinion Italian football should:  
- Keep indebtedness under control and avoid too high debt exposure in order 
not to run a business with excessive debt such as Chelsea; 
- Aim only at footballers purchase and sporting result as in the Paris Saint 
Germain’s experience;  
- Oppose situations such as insane and uncontrolled growth from the patron.  
- Not support strong polarization and an unbalanced system as in Spain (Real 
Madrid and Barcelona don’t have competition).  
- Not support a closed system with low competition on the pitch.  
- Not bet on a trading based model as in France.  
In favour of foreign football system, Italian football should: 
- Take as example the German model in term of healthy and balance growth, 
high competition and low polarization.  
- Have a system which provides high-quality product such as English football 
along with the German model.  
- Strenghten the football political weight in order to get more support from 
institutions as in Germany and France.  
- Open this sector to fans, get familiar witht them (UK and Germany) and 
educate them in terms of healthy sport satisfaction and growth such as 
Germany. 
- Aim at a stronger federation ables to develop a commercial product as in 
Germany. 
- Invest in the youth sector and in facilities (stadiums and training centers) as 
in Germany.  
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- Discourage the growth of employees costs with innovative policies and 
agreement such as salary cup ad hoc, welfare plans and contracts with 
variable benefits. 
- Reduce the weight of sport agent with concerted action.  
- Diversify revenues composition as the main clubs in the UK, Barcelona and 
Real Madrid.  
- Adopt real estate management in relation to the ownership and management 
of the stadiums. 
- Make the product internationally attractive as in Premier League with 
benefits and growth margins in terms of TV broadcast, merchandising and 
sponsorship. 
- Be based on customer relationship management as for Bundes, Premier 
League, Barcelona and Real Madrid.  
- Develop innovative sponsorship agreements such as co-branding or training 
kits ad hoc.  
- Exploit intangible assets (right of likeness) and new media such as 
Facebook, Twitter and social network in general to increase revenue. 
 
In this way the Italian football system could enhance its own management. 
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